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Abstract 
The dissertation studies monetary policy in the UK and specifically three topics: the 
monetary policy reaction function of the Bank of England, the influence of QE on 
nominal income and the determination of inflation and the role of money in it.  
In the study of the reaction function of the Bank of England in chapter 2 (which draws 
on Cobham and Kang, 2012a), there are two issues involved a comparison of two 
different approaches: the GMM approach and the ex ante forecast approach. The first 
issue is the time horizons for inflation and the output gap. The estimations using the 
GMM method indicate that the best fit is for inflation one year ahead and for the output 
gap one quarter ahead. The estimations in the ex ante forecast approach indicate the best 
fit should be for inflation two years ahead and output growth one quarter ahead, which 
is closer to the Bank of England’s view. The second issue is about the smoothing 
behaviour in interest rate decisions. The GMM method suggests smoothing behaviour 
incorporated in a lagged dependent variable while the ex ante forecast method suggests 
no smoothing since the lagged change of the interest rate is not significant in the 
regression. The latter suggestion is also closer to former policy makers’ views. In 
addition, the GMM method may suffer from a weak instruments problem and the ex 
ante forecast approach is a better method to estimate the monetary policy reaction 
function. I also try to apply the ex ante forecast approach to the reaction function of the 
European Central Bank, with results which are less precise but still closer to what the 
ECB claims to do. 
The third and the fourth chapters address the monetary aggregates, which have been 
ignored in monetary policy research for a long time but fluctuated strongly during the 
financial crisis period and after QE was implemented. What’s more, while most work in 
recent years focuses on the fluctuations in financial markets, the dissertation discusses 
the influence of the crisis and QE on macroeconomic activity. In chapter 3 (which draws 
on Cobham and Kang, 2012b), a flow of funds matrix is used to illustrate the monetary 
developments. This is followed by regressions of a naïve ad hoc reduced form model 
which considers the growth of nominal spending as determined by the growth of 
nominal money and other variables. The results of the regression suggest that money 
has had a bigger role since the crisis and under QE. Then various counterfactual 
assumptions about money growth are made and the counterfactual paths of nominal 
spending are calculated by using the estimated parameters of the regression above. The 
comparison of those counterfactuals indicates that QE has had a considerable influence 
on nominal spending.  In the fourth chapter, money growth is studied in a long-run 
perspective, in terms of its relation with inflation. In a reduced-form Phillips curve, 
inflation is explained by variables at different frequencies. The money growth, GDP 
growth and interest rate change which are included in the Quantity Theory of Money are 
expected to link inflation at low frequency while the output gap as well as exchange rate 
and import price has a relation with inflation at high frequency. The frequency-domain 
technique is used in this process. The estimated results suggest money has a relationship 
with inflation only at low frequency while the output gap, on the other hand, relates 
inflation at high frequency. Then regressions on low frequency and high frequency are 
also run. Frequency-wise causality measures follow to support the indications. From the 
results given by the third and fourth chapters, it is suggested that it is the time to pay 
attention to money again in monetary policy research. And it would be useful to 
incorporate money or credit into wider macroeconometric models of the UK economy. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
When inflation targeting was introduced in the 1990s by central banks in the main 
developed countries, formally or informally, the monetary policy frameworks in these 
areas started to change towards a single type with identical characteristics, under which 
the inflation rate was brought for nearly twenty years to a lower and more stable level 
than under previous monetary policy frameworks. The common factors in these 
monetary policy frameworks include the aim of monetary policy, the instrument used, 
the reaction function, the independence of the central bank and so on. Table 1.1 provides 
a comparison of the monetary policy frameworks of the Federal Reserve (FR), the Bank 
of England (BoE) and the European Central Bank (ECB) from several aspects. These 
similar arrangements in the table consist of a new type of framework that involved a 
clear precommitment and improved the central banks’ credibility, which helped to lower 
the inflation expectations of the private sector and helped to stabilize inflation.  
The Bank of England embarked on this new framework after UK’s exit from the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in September of 1992, and the framework 
was then enhanced in 1997 when the independence of BoE was increased. The first 
innovation of the new monetary policy framework1 was to change the policy target to an 
inflation target—an initial range of 1%-4% on the RPIX (retail prices index excluding 
mortgage interest payments) but 2.5% by the end of the Parliament (i.e. 1997), and this 
was continued as 2.5% of RPIX in 1997. Under the new arrangements the Bank’s goal 
was formally stated as to “maintain price stability and subject to that objective, to 
support the government’s economic policy, including its objectives for growth and 
employment”. (BEQB, 1998(2): 93).2 Inflation targeting, compared to other targets in 
the UK’s history, has a better performance in stabilising demand shocks and influencing 
inflation expectations, under a simple analysis using the AD-AS model. (See Cobham, 
2002, p.8 and table 1.1). And the publication of inflation forecasts in the Inflation 
Report, which was another important feature in the new framework, helped to rescue the 
credibility of monetary policy from the low point it reached on Black Wednesday. The 
Inflation Report, first published in 1993, originally included the ‘central projection’ of 
                                                             
1 There are some differences between the policy framework at 1993 and that from 1997: the BoE 
became operationally independent in 1997; the members of the MPC became individually 
accountable in 1997; the objective of inflation became 2.5% rather than a range; and the published 
forecasts began to include the variance and skews. Though the new framework was in some sense 
completed only in 1997, inflation targeting started in 1993 and the transparency and accountability 
improved a lot from then, I include the period during 93 and 97 in the new framework period. 
2 BEQB is short for Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 
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inflation over the next two years with a range either side but this was replaced by a ‘fan 
chart’ in 1996. The ‘fan chart’ shows a central band indicating the central projection 
with 10% probability that inflation would fall in this band and also shows further bands 
in which inflation would fall with a chance of 20%, 30%, etc. (BEQB, 1996a: 46-8) The 
information contained in this publication was intended to enhance the transparency and 
openness of the monetary policy, in order to help the private sector understand the 
intentions of the central bank better and to lower inflation expectations. The reputation 
of monetary policy and the credibility of the central bank started to improve. Especially, 
the increased independence of the Bank of England from 1997 made that reputation 
better and made the policy more time-consistent. 3 Another characteristic of the new 
framework is that the role of interest rate in influencing the economy was enhanced, or 
at least clarified. Though information on other variables including the monetary 
aggregates is still mentioned in the Inflation Report, the policy makers focus on making 
decisions on the bank rate or the repo rate. Under the popular New Keynesian model, it 
is the change in interest rate that can affect spending and investing decisions and thus 
affect aggregate demand. Given the inflation target set by the Chancellor, the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) in the central bank is responsible for interest rate adjustment 
to maintain price stability. In Kohn (2001), the work on interest rate decision making 
was described. The latest data have to be collected and analyzed before the MPC’s 
monthly meetings and the information is used in the MPC’s discussion. Every member 
has his own views about the central forecasts on the economic activity based on the 
current analysis and various models. They vote for a particular proposition and the 
published record shows their attitude to the interest rate decision, whether they prefer a 
rise, no change or a decrease in the current interest rate.  
Under this monetary policy framework, the outcome for economic activity in UK 
improved since 1993 and has been more satisfactory after 1997 than in previous periods. 
Figure 1.1 shows the inflation and GDP growth rate. 4 The annual growth rate of RPIX 
had been in the range of 5% to 20% and it was highly variable between 1976 and 1983, 
and that was followed by a relatively steady period of around 5% inflation until 1989. 
There was another peak at the end of 1990 at 9.3% and inflation was at 4.3% in the third 
quarter of 1992 when the UK stopped fixing its exchange rate. Inflation fell 
                                                             
3 Before the independence of the BoE, the disagreements between the Chancellor and the Governor 
on interest rate decision may have led the private sector to have less confidence and may have 
harmed credibility. See King (BEQB,1999c:297). See also Chadha, Macmillan and Nolan (2006).  
4 The BoE changed its inflation measure from RPIX to CPI in 2004. Thus I put both series in the 
figure. 
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continuously once inflation targeting started and remained below 3% up to 2007. The 
annual growth rate of the CPI, which is only available since 1988, shows a similar trend. 
It peaked in 1991 and declined afterwards to 2.7% in 1992 Q4 and then stayed around 2% 
from 1994. Both RPIX and CPI show that inflation was controlled under the new 
monetary policy framework at a lower level than in previous periods. And it has also 
been more stable. However, inflation began to fluctuate again from 2008 and reached 
4.8% on the CPI in the autumn of 2008. Then it decreased to 1.5% one year later but 
started to pick up again in 2010. Inflation during the crisis period has been variable. On 
the other hand, GDP growth shows three low points in the whole period. The first 
happened in 1980/81 and the second was in 1990/91. GDP growth increased from a 
negative value in 1991 to 4.8% in 1994 and then varied around 3.5% until 2007. The 
third trough in the figure started from 2008 Q3 and GDP growth did not return to a 
positive level until 2010 Q1. After that, the GDP growth kept on increasing slightly to 
2.4% in 2010Q3 and then dropped again, particularly since 2011Q2. It maintained 
negative in 2012. Despite the unusual performance in the crisis period, inflation and 
GDP from 1993 have been kept at desirable levels and with low variability.  
 
Table 1.1 The frameworks of the monetary policy 
 The ECB The FRB The BoE 
Targets 
Price stability 
(inflation below, and 
now close to, 2% on 
HICP) 
Informal 
inflation 
targeting and 
unemployment 
Formal inflation 
targeting of 2% on 
CPI 
Policy rates Refinancing rate Federal fund rate Bank rate 
Independence highest high Instrument but not policy 
Forecasts Staff forecasts only for the calendar year 
Staff forecasts 
but is published 
with a lag of 5 
years 
Published every 
quarter (in Inflation 
Report) 
Monetary 
reference value Yes, but status unclear No No 
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Figure 1.1 RPIX, CPI and GDP growth  
 
When assessing the monetary policy of a central bank, a core question is how the 
instrument is adjusted by the policy makers in response to the development of the 
economy (Svensson, 1999). The study of this question is often undertaken mainly 
through an analysis of the reaction function of the central bank, which shows the 
monetary authorities’ response to the deviation of variables from target or trend. When 
central banks focus on using interest rates to target inflation, it is popular to estimate the 
reaction function by a Taylor Rule. In Taylor (1993), the interest rate responds to the 
deviation of inflation from its target level and to the current output gap, and Taylor 
proposed this specific rule with specific coefficients. The interest rates implied by this 
rule were quite similar to those set by the Federal Reserve over the period 1987-92 
(Taylor 1993:204, Figure 1). Many economists have estimated a reaction function of 
that form, in order to obtain estimates of the coefficients for other central banks. Among 
these empirical studies, some found the exchange rate was also significant in the 
reaction function, which means some central banks respond to the exchange rate as well. 
Some studies show central banks responding to the monetary growth rate also. One 
particular specification which has been widely implemented is the ‘forward-looking 
specification’. Here central banks do not respond to the current deviation of inflation 
from target, as originally proposed in Taylor (1993), but to the expectation of that in the 
future. In other words, if the policy makers are deciding whether they should change the 
interest rate this month, they generally consider the inflation and output at some future 
date, for example the levels expected in one year’s time.  
For the new monetary policy framework used in the Bank of England since 1997, one 
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could use the Taylor rule to estimate the reaction function, at least for the period 
between the ‘independence’ of the BoE in 1997 and the crisis in 2008.  As there are 
several empirical studies which estimate the reaction function of the BoE for the period 
between 1980 and 2000 (Table 2.1 in Chapter 2), I put my attention on two specific 
issues when considering the period 1997 to 2007. The first issue relates to the time 
horizon of forward-looking variables: how long should the leads on inflation and output 
be? The Bank of England claimed on their website that “the maximum effect on output 
is estimated to take up to about one year. And the maximum impact of a change in 
interest rates on consumer price inflation takes up to about two years”. 5 But most 
empirical estimates of the reaction function have used a horizon of one year on inflation 
and a horizon of zero on output. The second issue is about interest rate smoothing: the 
approach used in the previous literature put a lagged interest rate into the regression and 
interpreted its significance as evidence of interest rate smoothing. However, this 
conclusion is doubted by some former members of the MPC in the BoE (e.g. Goodhart, 
2005). Whether the Bank of England smoothed the interest rate and what is the ‘proper’ 
definition of interest rate smoothing will be discussed in the thesis. 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation focuses on the two issues above by estimating the 
monetary policy reaction function of the Bank of England by two forward-looking 
approaches: the conventional GMM approach and the ex-ante forecast method 
developed by Goodhart (2005). In each case the horizons for inflation and output are 
varied to find the best fit. It turns out that for the standard GMM approach the best fit 
occurs for inflation four quarters ahead and the output gap one quarter ahead, while the 
best fit for the ex ante forecast approach is with inflation eight quarters ahead and 
output growth one quarter ahead. The latter horizons are much closer to what is implied 
by the Bank’s views on the transmission mechanism. In addition the standard GMM 
approach requires a lagged dependent variable which implies an implausibly slow 
adjustment of the policy interest rate to an inflation shock, while in the ex ante forecast 
approach there is no need for a lagged term in the change in policy rate. The standard 
GMM approach also suffers from a weak instruments problem.  In the light of these 
findings it is argued that the ex-ante forecast approach is the better way to estimate the 
monetary policy reaction function.  
In the last section of Chapter 2, the ex-ante forecast approach is applied to the 
                                                             
5 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/how.aspx 
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estimation of the reaction function of the ECB. As it is impossible to calculate the ‘ex-
ante projections’ for the ECB from the data available, I have used the projections in the 
ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) as a proxy for the ECB’s own forecasts. 
And I consider different timings of interest rate in running the estimation. None of the 
results supports the identification of the horizons in the estimation of reaction function 
as 4 quarters for inflation and zero quarters for output. The preferred result indicates the 
coefficient of deviation of the inflation projection from target should be around 1, which 
is similar to what I got in the BoE case. 
After the key policy rates had reached their lower bounds in 2008-9, both in the US and 
the UK, their central banks each started to implement unconventional policy in response 
to the worsening financial crisis. This unconventional monetary policy, under which the 
central banks purchase large amounts of securities from the private sector by increasing 
the reserves of the banks, is called ‘Quantitative Easing’ (QE). The Federal Reserve 
began its ‘Large-Scale Asset Purchases’ (LSAP) from November 2008 and had 
purchased US$1.75 trillion assets in total by March 2010. The Bank of England 
announced it would implement QE in March 2009 and completed it with £200 billion in 
2010 Q1.  
The purpose of QE as claimed by the Bank of England is “to inject money directly into 
the economy in order to boost nominal demand. Despite this different means of 
implementing monetary policy, the objective remained unchanged - to meet the inflation 
target of 2 per cent on the CPI measure of consumer prices.”, 6 in which money is 
emphasized again twenty years after the abandonment of monetary targets by the Bank 
of England. In the monetary policy framework I described at the beginning, it is interest 
rates which policy makers use to hit the inflation target not money. Though the data on 
the monetary aggregates is reported in the Inflation Report, this is only as an indicator 
not a policy instrument. And in most studies of the reaction function in the last twenty 
years, 7the monetary aggregates were not even used as instruments in forming inflation 
projections. It seems that the monetary aggregates have been ignored in monetary policy 
research during the tranquil time of the Great Moderation. Now the Bank of England 
has at least in part come back to the monetary aggregates when the financial crisis had 
led to very low inflation forecasts and the interest rate was at the effective lower bound 
                                                             
6 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/qe/default.aspx 
7 Those works are the papers using the GMM approach which I discuss in Chapter 2.  
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(ELB). However, in contrast to the earlier monetary targeting policy, the objective after 
the crisis remains unchanged, which is “to meet the inflation target of 2 per cent on the 
CPI measure of consumer prices”. It is clear that the conduct of QE is not a replacement 
of the monetary policy strategy in the pre-crisis period but a supplement to it. QE 
brought about an injection of £200 billion into the economy and this exogenous shock 
arguably gave money supply a causal role in macroeconomic activity. Under the BoE’s 
aim of “boosting the supply of money and credit and thus raising the rate of growth of 
nominal spending to a level consistent with meeting the inflation target in the medium 
term”,8 the latter part of the dissertation consists of studies of money’s role in monetary 
policy after the crisis – how money affects output in the medium term and inflation in 
the long run.  Unlike other work on QE, my study does not emphasize money’s 
influence on financial markets but focuses on its direct effect on macroeconomic 
activity. 
Chapter 3 emphasizes the effect of QE on medium-term output, as announced by the 
BoE when QE started. At the beginning of this chapter, I do a simple SVAR analysis in 
line with other research, in order to estimate the impact of QE. Instead of using spreads 
in the model, I interpret the QE shock as an increase in broad money. This attempt at 
SVAR analysis produces similar results to studies that have included financial market 
variables in their SVAR models. Then in order to show monetary developments under 
QE, I use a flow of funds matrix to argue that the financial crisis and QE have 
constituted exogenous shocks to money and credit which could not be absorbed 
immediately. I also present a reduced form regression which treats the growth of 
nominal spending as determined by the growth rate of nominal money and other 
variables. The results suggest that money growth may not be important in the pre-crisis 
period but have a larger role in the period of crisis and QE. By using the parameters 
from the estimation, I create four counterfactual scenarios which consider the effects of 
QE under different assumptions about the offsets, in order to illustrate the impact of 
crisis and QE. The estimates of the impact under this method are a bit larger than what 
the SVAR models suggest but quite close. The results in this chapter suggest that in the 
medium term monetary aggregates have some influence on output. And even without 
detailed analysis through the financial markets, we can still get information from the 
development of money about the movements in the UK economy. 
                                                             
8 Press statement 5 March 2009, available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2009/019.htm 
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Chapter 4 illustrates inflation determination and money’s role in it in the long run. 
Because the Bank of England looks at inflation and nominal spending in the medium 
run as well as inflation in the long run, it will help us understand QE better by studying 
the relationship between money and inflation in the long run. In this chapter, a Phillips-
Curve regression is estimated. The regressors include the standard Quantity Theory 
variables, the output gap and two cost-push variables. Inflation, as well as other 
variables, is decomposed into components of different frequencies by the frequency-
domain technique. The results indicate that money has a long-run impact in inflation 
determination. Particularly, when the crisis/QE period is taken into consideration, the 
coefficient on money is larger. On the other hand, in the medium term, money is not 
significant in the regression no matter whether the crisis/QE period is included or not. 
And it is the output gap which has a significant role in determining inflation, as well as 
exchange rate in short-term. This evidence suggests that money can influence inflation 
in the long run directly and it should not be ignored when people analyze monetary 
policy strategy. In the short run, the shocks to money may not have effects immediately 
on inflation directly but they will do so indirectly if changes in money can affect the 
output gap. 
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Chapter 2. Time Horizons and Smoothing in Reaction Function  
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I focus on two particular issues in the estimation of a monetary policy 
reaction function, for the case of the Bank of England. The first issue concerns the time 
horizon of the forward-looking variables in the regressions, where the standard 
approach as identified by Favero (2001, ch. 7) specifies a 12-month lead on inflation 
and current output. These leads are at odds with published statements by the Bank of 
England which emphasize that the full ‘impact of a change in interest rates on consumer 
price inflation takes up to about two years’, while the corresponding lag for output is up 
to about one year; these statements imply that the Bank ought to be setting interest rates 
in response to forecasts for inflation around eight quarters ahead (and output around 
four quarters ahead), and this is how it is generally believed to operate. 
The second issue is the role of a lagged dependent variable in the reaction function, 
where the standard approach includes such a variable and interprets its presence as 
allowing for interest rate smoothing. However, there is considerable doubt as to whether 
the Bank of England really smoothes (see, for example, Cobham, 2003), and some 
former members of the Monetary Policy Committee have rejected the claim (see, for 
example, Goodhart, 2005).9   
In order to investigate these issues further, I compare the results of two different 
techniques for estimating the Bank of England’s reaction function, for the period 1997 
to 2007: the standard approach exemplified by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000) 
and what we shall call the ‘ex ante forecast’ approach used by Goodhart (2005). 
Section 2.2 introduces the issues and the two estimation approaches. Section 2.3.1 
presents the results of estimations of the standard approach over the period since the 
Bank was given control of interest rates (operational independence) in mid-1997, with 
varying leads on inflation and the output gap. Section 2.3.2 extends and confirms 
Goodhart’s (2005) findings, and shows the results of systematic variation of the leads on 
inflation and output growth. Section 2.4 compares the two sets of findings. Section 2.5 
                                                             
9 Similar doubts have been expressed with respect to smoothing by the Federal Reserve Board in the 
US, and Rudebusch (2002, 2006) has provided considerable indirect evidence against such 
smoothing. 
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applies the ex-ante approach to the case of the ECB. Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2. Two approaches 
Taylor put forward his instrument rule for monetary policy in 1993 both as a 
recommendation of how policy should be operated and as a rough description of what 
the Federal Reserve Board had done in recent years. The original Taylor rule suggested 
the Fed rate should respond to contemporaneous inflation and output gap with the 
coefficients of 1.5 and 0.5 respectively. Taylor didn't specify the target of the central 
bank—whether it should target inflation only or the real output gap as well – but 
focuses instead on how the central bank should adjust its instrument. The implied 
reaction function contains information on both policy makers' preferences and the 
structure of the economy. To investigate policy makers' preferences, the standard 
analysis usually considers the minimization of the central bank's loss function together 
with other sectors' optimization problems. Woodford (2003) and Favero (2001) have 
discussed this in a New Keynesian model which consists of three equations: 
The demand equation: 𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑡 − 𝛽𝛾(𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑒) + 𝜇𝑡+1𝑑  (2.1) 
The Phillips Curve:  𝜋𝑡+1 = 𝜋𝑡 + 𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡+1𝑠  (2.2) 
And the intertemporal optimization problem:𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛿𝑖 𝐿𝑡+𝑖 (2.3) 
where L =  o. 5[(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋∗)2 + 𝜆𝑦𝑡2] 
By first-order differentiation of the equation (2.3) and combining the three equations, 
they derived an interest rate rule: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟𝑟𝑒 + 𝜋∗ + �1 + 1𝛼𝑦𝛽𝛾� ( 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 − 𝜋∗) + 𝜆𝛿𝛼𝑦𝑘 1𝛼𝑦𝛽𝛾 𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑦𝛽𝛾 𝑦𝑡 (2.4) 
Where  k = 1 + 𝛿𝜆𝑘
𝜆+𝑘𝛿𝛼𝑦
2  ,𝑦 represents deviations of output from its natural level, 𝑟𝑡is the 
policy rate, 𝑟𝑟𝑒  is the equilibrium value of the rate,  𝜆 represents policy makers' 
preference on output gap, 𝜋∗  is the target inflation rate and  𝛿  is the discount 
factor .(𝛽𝑦, 𝛽𝛾, 𝛼𝑦, 𝑟𝑟𝑒) describe the structure of the economy. For further details, see 
Favero (2001, p.241) 
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If we just estimate the single reaction function (2.4), it is impossible to identify either 
the parameter describing the central bank's preference or those describing the structure 
of the economy. However, we can still get some useful information. When 𝜆=0, it 
indicates that the policy makers do not care about output (which might mean they were 
doing strict inflation targeting). So if the estimate of the coefficient of the expected 
output gap is zero, we can tell that the output gap is not in the central bank's loss 
function. However, if it is not zero, we still cannot reject the possibility that the central 
bank is targeting inflation only. Woodford suggested that output gap is useful in 
modeling inflation dynamics. (Woodford 2003, p 613) With nominal rigidity, the output 
gap has a close relationship with inflation in the future. And allowing the output gap in 
the loss function does not mean that policy makers have dual targets. 
With respect to the policy makers' preferences, another question related to the Taylor 
rule has attracted more attention in recent years, and that is the value of the coefficient 
on inflation. The original Taylor rule gave signs for the coefficients and indicated the 
magnitude of response to inflation was larger than one, in which condition the change in 
interest rate was strong enough to stabilize inflation. Moreover, Taylor (1999) has 
shown clearly that if the coefficient on inflation is smaller than one, a positive inflation 
shock will lead to a rise in the nominal interest rate which would not be sufficient to 
prevent the real rate from declining, in which case inflation will rise further, and the 
system will be unstable. Equation (2.4) also indicates that when the optimization 
problems in all sectors are considered, a successful policy rule which stabilizes inflation 
well shows a larger than one coefficient when 𝛼𝑦  and 𝛽𝛾  are for theoretical reasons 
unlikely to be negative. On the other hand, when I estimate the reaction function of the 
BoE using the ex ante forecast approach, I am regressing the policy rate on the 
authorities’ forecasts of inflation and output growth (which must encompass the 
structure of the economy as they perceive it). The regression coefficients therefore 
represent much more clearly than in the GMM approach the behaviour of the authorities 
in response to (their forecasts of) inflation and output growth 
 There has been a large amount of empirical work in recent years designed to identify 
how exactly different central banks in different periods have behaved. The tone for this 
work was set by the work of Clarida, Galí and Gertler (hereinafter CGG) (1998), which 
developed an errors-in-variables/Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) approach to 
estimate monetary policy reaction functions and applied it to the US, Japan and 
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Germany (the ‘G3’ countries) and France, Italy and the UK (the ‘E3’). In the first three 
an interest rate (typically the three month interbank rate) was regressed in a forward-
looking manner on the output gap and on inflation, with a lagged dependent variable 
which was interpreted as allowing for interest rate smoothing.  
CGG’s 1998 paper was also one of those first attempts to estimate a reaction function 
for the UK. They included the German short term interest rate as an extra explanatory 
variable on the grounds that the UK was managing its currency against the Deutsche 
Mark (DM) over their period, which extended from the start of the Thatcher government 
in June 1979 to the UK’s entry into the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European 
Monetary System in October 1990.10 When this variable was not included the inflation 
coefficient was just under unity; but when it was included the inflation coefficient was 
only 0.48 but the coefficient on the German interest rate was 0.60. CGG interpreted this 
as suggesting that the Bank of England set interest rates as a weighted average of the 
German rate (with a weight of 0.6) and a domestic policy rule (weight 0.4) with an 
inflation coefficient of 1.20. CGG used leads of zero on output and 12 months on 
inflation; they justified the latter as follows: “Based on our casual sense of how central 
banks operate, I choose a horizon of one year… Policy makers… are more concerned 
about medium and longer term trends [in inflation]… the year ahead forecast seems a 
good indicator of the medium term trend in inflation” (1998: 1042).11 The coefficient on 
their lagged dependent variable was 0.87. 
Key features of some other investigations of the UK which use broadly the same 
approach are identified in Table 2.1. Angeloni and Dedola (1999) and Kuttner and Posen 
(1999) use the same leads as CGG: 12 months for inflation and zero for the output gap. 
Adam, Cobham and Girardin (AGG) (2005) used 9 and zero (which emerged from a 
wider search across a grid of periods).  Nelson (2000) used leads of zero or one, for both 
quarterly and monthly data. Most estimates for the lagged dependent variable were 
around 0.85 for monthly data, but Nelson had lower values especially, as would be 
expected, when he used quarterly data. 
                                                             
10 There is no doubt that the pound-DM exchange rate was an important consideration in UK 
monetary policy from some point in the mid-1980s, and the UK ‘shadowed’ the DM between March 
1987 and March 1988. But in the early years of the period policy was aggressively domestic in 
orientation, with very little attention paid to the exchange rate or the external context (see Cobham, 
2002). 
11 They also stated that their results were not sensitive to changes of 6-9 months in the lead on 
inflation, or to the introduction of a 3-6 month lead on output. 
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A different approach, with different results, was used by Goodhart (2005). Instead of 
instrumenting within a GMM framework, Goodhart reconstructs what he calls ex ante 
forecasts of inflation and output growth: these are the forecasts that the MPC would 
have had in front of it before it made the interest rate changes, derived by applying 
information from the Bank of England’s published statement on ‘The Transmission 
Mechanism of Monetary Policy’ (Bank of England, 1999) about the effects of interest 
rate changes on future inflation and output growth to the published quarterly forecasts.12 
He then uses these forecasts, in the form of their deviations from the inflation target and 
the underlying trend of output growth, respectively, in OLS regressions. He does this 
first with the level of the policy interest rate as the dependent variable and then, when 
the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable turns out to be insignificantly different 
from unity, with the change in the policy rate regressed on the (deviations of the) levels 
of the inflation and output growth forecasts. And in each case he considers leads on 
inflation and output growth varying (together) from zero to eight quarters.  
The results are in striking contrast to those of the standard approach. Goodhart gets a 
much better fit for the regressions where the time horizon is seven or eight quarters (on 
both inflation and output growth), and in these cases the coefficients on inflation are 
significantly above unity (so that the Taylor Principle that real interest rates should rise 
in response to a rise in inflation is fulfilled) while the coefficients on output growth are 
typically not significant. In addition lagged terms on the change in the policy rate turn 
out to be insignificant, which Goodhart interprets as implying that the MPC does not 
engage in ‘gradualism’. 
In the next two sections I present comparable results for the standard and the ex ante 
forecast approaches, using quarterly data over the same time period (1997 Q3 to 2007 
Q4).13 I confirm that the basic results of Goodhart’s analysis (which only went up to 
2003 Q3) hold for the longer period. And I estimate both approaches over a full ‘grid’ of 
leads on inflation and the output gap (for the standard approach) or output growth (for 
the ex ante forecast approach), varying each lag separately from zero to eight quarters 
                                                             
12 Goodhart uses output growth (since four quarters earlier) because that is the variable for which the 
Bank publishes forecasts. As he points out, the Bank has not published explicit data for output gaps 
(see also Adam and Cobham, 2009: 105-7). 
 
13 Since the Bank of England publishes forecasts on a quarterly basis only, we can only do this with 
quarterly data. It should be noted that while Clarida, Galí and Gertler used monthly data in their 
(1998) paper they used quarterly data in their longer study (2000) of the US. 
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(however, I restrict the lead on the output variable to be equal to or less than that on 
inflation, in line with conventional ideas on the transmission mechanism). I then 
compare these two sets of results in section 2.4. The application on the euro area is in 
section 2.5.  
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TABLE 2.1: Selected tests of the standard approach 
 
 Period Inflation  Output  Lagged dependent 
variable 
Horizons 
(months) 
Other variables and weight 
Clarida et al. (1998) 1979M6-
1990M10 
0.48 0.28 0.87 (12,0) German interest rate 0.60 
Angeloni and 
Dedola (1999) 
1980M1-
1987M12 
0.72 0.60 0.87 (12,0) German interest rate 1.32, as well as M3, real 
exch rate 
 1988M1-
1997M4 
0.32 0.73 0.86 (12,0) German interest rate 0.45, $/DM exch rate 
Kuttner and Posen 
(1999) 
1984M1-
1989M12 
1.64 -0.21a 0.86 (12,0) -- 
 1992M10-
1999M4 
0.52a -0.29 0.79 (12,0) -- 
Muscatelli et al. 
(2002) 
1985Q1-
1999Q1 
1.40 0.57 not reported (1,0) -- 
Nelson (2000) 1979Q2-
1987Q1 
0.38 0.15 0.37 (0,0) -- 
 1987M3-
1990M9 
0.00 0.45 0.52 (1,0) German interest rate 1.11 
 1992Q4-
1997Q1 
1.27 0.47 0.29 (1,0) -- 
Adam, Cobham and 
Girardin (2005) 
1997M4-
2002M7 
1.89 1.30 0.85 (9,0) -- 
Note a not significant 
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2.3. Estimations for the two approaches 
2.3.1.The standard approach 
Here I follow closely the method pioneered by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998). The 
specification I estimate is    
rt= (1-ρ)α + (1-ρ)βπ t+j  + (1-ρ)γyt+k   + ρrt-1 + υt     (2.5) 
where the interest rate r reacts to inflation π and the output gap y, (1-ρ)α is the constant 
term, and a lagged dependent variable is included on the right hand side to allow for 
smoothing, in line with the standard approach. This equation can be thought of as being 
derived from a Taylor rule for the ‘desired’ policy rate and a partial adjustment of the 
actual rate towards the desired level, as follows: 
r*t= α + βπ t+j  + γyt+k          (2.6) 
 
rt = (1-ρ)r*t + ρrt-1  + εt        (2.7) 
 
The error term in the estimating equation (2.5) consist of two parts: the forecast error 
and the exogenous shock,  
υt   = - {(1-ρ)β(π t+j  - Et π t+j ) + (1-ρ)γ(yt+k   - Et yt+k ) } +  εt    (2.8) 
and it is assumed that the forecast errors are uncorrelated with the current interest rate. 
The coefficients to be estimated, i.e. (1-ρ)α, (1-ρ)β and (1-ρ)γ, are the short run 
coefficients; long run equivalents can be obtained by dividing these by (1-ρ) where ρ is 
the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
The Bank of England’s target was expressed in terms of the RPIX inflation index up to 
the end of 2003, and then in terms of the CPI (with the target itself being adjusted 
downwards from 2.5% to 2%, a change which was regarded as reflecting the difference 
in the index rather than a change of underlying objective). Since the Bank publishes the 
CPI for the years before 2004, I use those data here for the whole period. 
The output gaps for the UK, the US and the eurozone are constructed by detrending 
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with the HP filter, with the smoothing parameter set to 1600.14 This technique was 
chosen as the most common method of detrending, but over this period, where the 
cyclical fluctuations are relatively small, the choice of technique is unlikely to make 
much difference (see Adam and Cobham, 2009). 
The interest rate used is the official Bank rate. Other work in this vein has tended to use 
a 3-month interbank rate, but for an economy like the UK this rate may reflect 
international arbitrage pressures as well as official policy decisions. ACG found that the 
policy rate produced results very close to those for the interbank rate, though they were 
also a little less well-defined. 
The basic idea of using GMM to estimate the reaction function comes from the 
orthogonal relationship between the instruments and the error term. As the error term υt  
is correlated with the independent variables, I need some instruments which are highly 
correlated with inflation and the output gap but not with the forecast error and 
exogenous shock. I therefore include in the instrument set the variables used by Clarida 
et al., that is lagged interest rates, lagged inflation rates, lagged output gaps and the 
lagged world commodity price index, to which I added lagged output gaps for the US 
and the eurozone. 
Table 2.2 presents the values of β and γ (the long run coefficients on inflation and the 
output gap) derived from the coefficient estimates in regressions of (2.5), with j, the 
lead on inflation, and k, the lead on the output gap, varying from zero to eight quarters, 
but with k ≤ j. In each cell the upper number is the estimated value of β and the lower 
number is the estimated value of γ. Estimates in bold italics are significantly different 
from zero at the 1% significance level, those in bold (only) at the 5% level, those in 
italics (only) at the 10% level, and those in regular font are not significantly different 
from zero. Table 2.3 presents the root mean squared errors (RMSEs) for each of these 
regressions. 
  
                                                             
14 GDP data from 1980 were used for the calculation of the UK output gap, and data from 1995 for 
the US and the eurozone. 
 
18 
 
TABLE 2.2: Estimated values of β and γ by the standard approach with varying 
time horizons 
β 
γ 
k=0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
j=0 1.85 
4.17 
        
1 1.70 
4.10 
1.23 
3.26 
       
2 1.69 
3.57 
1.27 
3.23 
1.42 
2.09 
      
3 1.58 
3.54 
1.86 
3.60 
1.98 
2.65 
2.78 
-0.32 
     
4 2.06 
3.32 
2.13 
3.27 
2.68 
2.15 
3.97 
0.01 
3.60 
-0.86 
    
5 2.07 
3.34 
2.57 
4.18 
5.14 
4.87 
13.44 
-1.60 
8.93 
-3.52 
7.43 
-0.40 
   
6 2.01 
4.15 
1.72 
3.42 
3.20 
3.25 
3.68 
-0.09 
3.29 
-2.01 
3.38 
-0.49 
2.85 
0.64 
  
7 1.44 
4.02 
0.86 
3.44 
0.95 
2.51 
1.10 
-0.77 
1.33 
-1.98 
0.85 
-0.27 
0.80 
0.04 
0.81 
-0.04 
 
8 1.27 
3.82 
0.41 
3.06 
0.58 
2.26 
0.59 
-0.89 
0.92 
-2.03 
0.41 
-0.82 
0.48 
-0.26 
0.42 
-0.61 
1.36 
-3.77 
Notes: colour coding as follows: 
Bold and italic: significantly different from zero at 1% significance level 
Bold: significantly different from zero at 5% level 
Italic: significantly different from zero at 10% level 
Regular: not significantly different from zero at 10% level 
 
 
TABLE 2.3: Root mean squared errors for standard approach regressions with 
varying time horizons 
RMSE k=0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
j=0 0.282         
1 0.287 0.283        
2 0.271 0.270 0.296       
3 0.273 0.267 0.294 0.311      
4 0.276 0.266 0.291 0.305 0.305     
5 0.272 0.269 0.288 0.304 0.304 0.302    
6 0.283 0.281 0.302 0 .312 0.313 0.311 0.311   
7 0.295 0.293 0.314 0.323 0.323 0.322 0.322 0.323  
8 0.297 0.298 0.319 0.329 0.328 0.327 0.328 0.329 0.328 
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From Table 2.3 the RMSEs vary between 0.266 and 0.329, with higher values towards 
the south-east of the table, where the leads are both closer to 8, and the lowest values at 
k = 1 and j = 3 or 4. Towards the south-east of the table the coefficients of β and γ as 
shown in Table 2 are typically insignificant, and in the case of γ often negative. For k ≤ 
2 and j ≤ 6, on the other hand, the coefficients are typically positive and significant, but 
although β is often > 1, γ is often > β. It seems clear, therefore, that the standard 
approach provides results which are stronger and partly in line with prior expectations 
(which would usually have γ < β), but only for  time horizons which are much shorter 
than those emphasized by the Bank of England and which are not consistent with the 
lags in the Bank’s view of the transmission mechanism. For horizons consistent with the 
MPC’s modus operandi, e.g. j = 8 and k = 4, the standard approach finds that the interest 
rate response to inflation is just under 1 and significant only at the 10% level, while the 
response to the output gap is significantly negative at the 5% level.  
Table 2.4 shows the values of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable for the 
same grid of regressions. These vary between 0.874 and 0.984. They tend to be higher 
and often not significantly different from unity towards the south-east of the table, but 
there is no clear pattern. For the ‘best’ fits with k = 1 and j = 3 or 4, however, the lagged 
dependent variable coefficients are significantly different from unity (and from zero) at 
0.888 and 0.890. 
TABLE 2.4: Estimates of ρ for the standard approach 
 
ρ k=0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
j=0 0.883         
1 0.893 0.874        
2 0.879 0.874 0.902       
3 0.880 0.888 0.912 0.955      
4 0.892 0.890 0.907 0.947 0.948     
5 0.898 0.918 0.947 0.984 0.979 0.972    
6 0.929 0.906 0.947 0.966 0.967 0.963 0.952   
7 0.923 0.893 0.930 0.944 0.948 0.928 0.927 0.925  
8 0.908 0.882 0.924 0.944 0.945 0.919 0.925 0.919 0.951 
Notes: colour coding as follows: 
Bold and italic: significantly different from 1 at 1% significance level 
Bold: significantly different from 1 at 5% level 
Italic: significantly different from 1 at 10% level 
Regular : not significantly different 1 zero at 10% level 
 
I have also estimated, but do not report for space reasons, the same equation but without 
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a lagged dependent variable. In these regressions the inflation coefficient is nearly 
always negative, and often significantly less than zero, while the output gap coefficient 
is in most cases around 1 and significant. In addition the RMSEs are typically three to 
four times larger than those when the lagged dependent variable is included. It is clear, 
therefore, that to get ‘decent’ results it is essential to include the lagged dependent 
variable. 
Finally, given the recent emphasis by Mavroeidis (2004) and Consolo and Favero (2009) 
on the issues of identification and weak instruments,15 the results of applying the Cragg-
Donald (1993) test for weak instruments are reported in Table 2.5. This shows that in 
most cases, including the best fit cases k = 1 and j = 3 or 4, the regressions fail the weak 
instruments test (and this is despite the fact that I have extended the instrument set from 
that of CGG by including output gaps for the US and the eurozone).16  
TABLE 2.5: Cragg-Donald tests for weak instruments in standard approach 
 
C-D k=0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
j=0 5.107         
1 4.494 4.477        
2 5.086 7.106 7.038       
3 4.724 5.655 5.939 5.229      
4 4.3 5.633 9.227 6.788 7.547     
5 3.969 4.981 7.506 7.241 6.086 3.655    
6 2.378 2.951 3.375 2.961 3.299 3.143 3.257   
7 2.212 1.888 2.212 1.983 2.162 1.954 2.067 2.215  
8 6.603 4.751 7.006 6.344 7.104 4.159 5.289 3.85 2.87 
Stock-Yogo (2002) weak ID test critical values:  
5% maximal IV relative bias     20.65;   10% maximal IV relative bias     11.05 
20% maximal IV relative bias        6.07;  30% maximal IV relative bias        4.33 
10% maximal IV size               51.70;   15% maximal IV size               27.56 
20% maximal IV size               19.38;   25% maximal IV size               15.19 
 
2.3.2. The ex ante forecast approach 
Here I follow the method set out by Goodhart (2005), the first step in which is to 
                                                             
15 Mavroeidis (2004) emphasises that the weak instruments problem arises ‘naturally’ when the 
predictable variation in inflation is low relative to unpredictable future shocks. Consolo and Favero 
(2009) favour a reverse form of the regression with inflation as the dependent variable; in this case 
they find significantly less inertia in monetary policy. 
16 The results of weak instrument tests when these output gaps are excluded are broadly similar to 
those reported here. 
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reconstruct the ex ante forecasts of inflation and output growth, that is the forecasts the 
MPC would have had in front of it before it made its interest rate decisions.17 First, I use 
data from Bank of England (1999) which gives the expected effect on inflation and 
output growth over successive quarters of changes in the policy rate, as in Table 2.6. I 
then assemble the forecasts for inflation and output growth over 0-8 quarters ahead as 
published with successive Inflation Reports; these are what Goodhart calls the ex post 
projections. I then take the interest rate changes in the month in which each Inflation 
Report was published, together with any changes in the preceding two months, multiply 
these numbers by the numbers in Table 2.6 and subtract the implied effects on inflation 
and output growth from the ex post projections in order to get the ex ante forecasts.18 
Table 2.6: The effect of interest rate changes on inflation and output growth 
according to the Bank’s model of the transmission mechanism 
a) Inflation 
quarters 
ahead 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
policy rate 
changes          
0.25%    0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 
0.5%    0.02 0.06 0.1 0.12 0.15 0.15 
0.75%    0.03 0.08 0.14 0.18 0.24 0.24 
1%    0.04 0.11 0.18 0.25 0.32 0.32 
b) Output growth 
quarters 
ahead 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
policy 
rate 
changes 
         
0.25% 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.04 
0.5% 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.08 
0.75% 0.03 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.12 
1% 0.03 0.12 0.21 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.29 0.25 0.16 
Source: Bank of England (1999) 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the results: it shows the resulting ex ante forecasts for inflation, 
                                                             
17 Following Goodhart, I consider together the changes in interest rate over the two months preceding 
the publication of each Inflation Report, with its forecasts, as well as the changes made in that month. 
Over the period as a whole just over half of all policy rate changes were made in Inflation Report 
months, when the MPC would have had in front of it a completely new forecast, as opposed to 
intervening months when no new full forecast would have been available 
18 We use the RPIX forecasts up to 2004 Q1, when the MPC produced forecasts for both RPIX and 
CPI, and the CPI forecasts (with the lower target) thereafter.  
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together with the published ex post forecasts, for two particular horizons, four and eight 
quarters ahead. The four quarter ahead forecasts in Figure 2.1(a) fluctuate widely but 
are always close to each other, which reflects the fact that the changes in the policy rate 
which are included in the ex post but not the ex ante forecast have only small effects 
within this time horizon (and the incidence of no-change quarters). The eight quarter 
ahead forecasts in Figure 2.1(b) are less close to each other, the ex post forecast in 
particular fluctuates less widely (it remains nearly always within 0.2% of the target) and 
they both show a distinct fall in 2004 when the inflation target was changed from 2.5% 
on the RPIX to 2% on the CPI.  
Once these forecasts are available, they can be used in simple OLS regressions to find 
how interest rate decisions are related to them. The first specification which Goodhart 
estimated was 
 rt= a + b(Et π t+j – π*)+c(Et gt+k – g*)+drt-1 +εt         (2.9) 
where the policy interest rate r reacts to the difference between forecast and target 
inflation π and the difference between forecast and trend output growth g, a is the 
constant, and a lagged dependent variable is included on the right hand side. 
Figure 2.1(a): Ex post and ex ante forecasts of inflation four quarters ahead 
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Figure 2.1(b): Ex post and ex ante forecast of inflation eight quarters ahead 
 
 
 
Inflation is the four-quarter growth of the RPIX index up to the first quarter of 2004, 
with the target at 2.5%, and then the four quarter growth of the CPI, with the inflation 
target at 2%. Output growth here is the growth of GDP since four quarters before, with 
trend growth set at 2.25%. The main reason for using output growth rather than the gap 
is that the Bank’s forecasts are for the former rather than the latter, but it seems more 
likely that the MPC reacts to the former rather than the latter, which it does not identify 
(Adam and Cobham, 2009). As Sauer and Sturm (2003) have shown, growth rate cycles 
tend to lead growth cycles, so that output growth can be seen as a forward indicator of 
the output gap: we should therefore expect a shorter lead on output growth than on the 
output gap. 
When Goodhart estimated equation (2.9) he found that the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable was insignificantly different from unity. He interpreted this as 
implying that the equation was misspecified, and went on to estimate an equation for the 
change in interest rates. I examined this directly by testing for unit roots in Table 2.7. 
Although the period is longer than Goodhart’s, it is still rather short for unit root tests to 
have much power. However, the evidence indicates that the interest rate is stationary 
only in first difference form, whereas the deviation of inflation from target and output 
growth from trend may be stationary in levels. In addition, Wald tests for the different 
horizons indicate that in nearly all cases, and certainly in the k = 0 or 1, j = 7 or 8, cases 
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d is insignificantly different from 1. I therefore tested the following specification, which 
is a rearrangement of (9) for the case where d = 1: 
  ∆rt= a + b(Et π t+j – π*) + c(Et gt+k – g*) + e∆rt-1 + εt       (2.10) 
where ∆r is the first difference of the interest rate and, following Goodhart, I included a 
lagged term in this difference to test for gradualism. The results showed that the lagged 
dependent variable was almost always insignificant, so I dropped it in favor of the 
following specification: 
  ∆rt= a + b(Et π t+j – π*) + c(Et gt+k – g*) + εt        (2.11) 
which corresponds to Goodhart’s Table 12 equation.19 
Table 2.7: Unit root tests  
Interest rate  
 T-statistic Prob* 
ADF -0.91 0.94(null: r has a unit root) 
PP -1.16 0.90(null : r has a unit root) 
KPSS LM-statistic: 
0.20 
Null : r is stationary 
Critical values: 
1% level: 0.22; 5% level:0.15; 10% level:0.12 
Inflation deviation: 
 j=0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
ADF -3.32 
(0.07) 
-2.68 
(0.25) 
-2.33 
(0.41) 
-2.12 
(0.52) 
-2.58 
(0.29) 
-3.67 
(0.04) 
-4.36 
(0.006) 
-4.20 
(0.009) 
-3.42 
(0.06) 
PP -1.98 
(0.59) 
-1.13 
(0.91) 
-1.3 
(0.87) 
-0.58 
(0.97) 
-1.65 
(0.76) 
-3.27 
(0.08) 
-4.23 
(0.009) 
-4.23 
(0.009) 
-3.42 
(0.06) 
KPSS 0.13 
(10%) 
0.15 
(5%) 
0.15 
(5%) 
0.16 
(5%) 
0.16 
(5%) 
0.13 
(10%) 
0.099 
ac) 
0.06 
(ac) 
0.096 
ac 
GDP growth deviation  
 k=0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
ADF -4.09 
(0.01) 
-4.29 
(0.008) 
-2.71 
(0.24) 
-0.94 
(0.94) 
-1.06 
(0.92) 
-2.54 
(0.31) 
-3.54 
(0.048) 
-3.82 
(0.026) 
-3.75 
(0.03
） 
PP -3.19 
(0.10) 
-2.37 
(0.39) 
-1.74 
(0.71) 
-1.08 
(0.92) 
-1.28 
(0.88) 
-0.73 
(0.96) 
-1.43 
(0.84) 
-2.70 
(0.24) 
-3.58 
(0.04) 
KPSS 0.04 
ac 
0.08 
ac 
0.14 
ac 
0.18 
(5%) 
0.18 
(5%) 
0.17 
(5%) 
0.15 
(5%) 
0.07 
ac 
0.16 
（ac） 
                                                             
19 There is one difference: Goodhart appears to have excluded the constant term from his regressions, 
arguing that when he took the first difference of the dependent variable on the left hand side of 
equation (2.5) the constant would drop out. This would be correct if equation (2.6) was the result of 
differencing all the variables in (2.5), but if it is a matter of assuming that d = 1 and rearranging the 
constant should still be there. In fact, the constant term in our equation (2.7) regressions is typically 
insignificant. 
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Goodhart reported regressions of this equation for the nine cases from j = k = 0 to j = k 
= 8, but I do this for the full grid, with j and k varying from zero to eight quarters but k 
≤ j, in Table 2.8. Table 2.9 reports the corresponding RMSE and LM statistics.  
From Table 2.9 the RMSEs vary between 0.206 and 0.308, but they are systematically 
lower in the bottom two rows (j = 7 or 8) and the best fit, as indicated by the smallest 
RMSEs, is obtained when j = 7 or 8 and k = 1 or 2. The LM statistics reported indicate 
that none of the residuals suffer from serial correlation. In Table 2.8 the values on the 
diagonal, where the leads on inflation and output growth are always the same, are 
broadly in line with what Goodhart found: as the horizon of the inflation and output 
growth deviations increases, the value of b increases while c is not significant at 
horizons of 7 and 8.  When I allow for differences in horizon between inflation and 
output growth, i.e. I consider the grid as a whole, it is clear that for j ≤ 6 the inflation 
coefficients are < 1 and nearly always insignificant while the output growth coefficients 
are positive and significant; but as j rises the estimated value of b rises, particularly after 
j = 5, and for j > 6 the inflation coefficients are significant and > 1, while the output 
growth coefficients become smaller and ultimately insignificant. In other words, the 
response of the interest rate to inflation is strongest for j = 7 or 8, while its response to 
output growth does not seem to vary systematically with k but is strongest for j = 3 to j 
= 5. In the group of cases where the RMSEs were lowest, that is j = 7 or 8 and k = 1 or 2, 
the inflation coefficients are > 1 and the output growth coefficients small but positive 
and significant; for the very lowest RMSE, where j = 8 and k = 1, the inflation 
coefficient is 1.16 and the output growth coefficient is 0.17 and significant. In this case 
b is also significantly greater than 1. On the other hand, in the cases where the standard 
approach finds the strongest relationships, i.e. j = 3 or 4 and k = 1, the output growth 
coefficients are significant but the inflation coefficients are insignificant. 
The results of the ex- ante forecast approach estimations, which are shown in table 2.8, 
are based on the Newey-West standard errors. I have also done bootstrap exercises on 
the regression. The coefficients are the same as those presented here and the RMSEs are 
also unchanged, which means this robustness check has no influence on the selection of 
horizons. I also ran estimations using the data to the end of 2008 when the interest rate 
was still decided in the same way as before and QE had not yet started. The results are 
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quite close to those in table 2.8 and table 2.9 and support the indication that policy 
makers respond to the forecast inflation deviation two years ahead20 and output growth 
one quarter ahead.  The coefficient of the inflation deviation two-years ahead is a bit 
smaller than that in table 2.8 but it still insignificantly different from 1. The coefficient 
of inflation at j=4 and k=1, which is suggested by the GMM method, is 0.2 and is 
insignificantly different from zero at the 90% level.  When the horizon of output growth 
is larger than 3, the coefficient of the inflation deviation becomes significantly different 
from 0 though it is much lower than 1.  
The financial crisis strongly affected the economy by a tightening in the credit market. 
The magnitude and the nature of these effects on the economy were different from 
anything experienced during the previous ten years. In particular, uncertainty around the 
inflation outlook became bigger. The weak identification problem for GMM would 
become severe if I included this period into the estimation and the results would have 
become more unreliable. Moreover, because the GMM method uses actual data for 
future inflation and output gap (on the assumption that there are no systematic errors in 
the forecasts), but from 2009 the level of output, in particular, was consistently much 
lower than what would have been expected, I prefer to stop the data in the end of 2007 
which excludes the crisis period, although there is no substantial difference in the results. 
 
  
                                                             
20 This time the smallest RMSE value appears at j=7 and k=1 but the RMSE at j=8 and k=1 is the 
second lowest value and is very close to it.  
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TABLE 2.8: Estimates of a, b and c by the ex ante forecast approach 
 
a 
b 
c 
k=0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
j=0 -0.08 
0.07 
0.30 
        
1 -0.08 
0.03 
0.30 
-0.10 
-0.02 
0.37 
       
2 -0.10 
-0.07 
0.29 
-0.09 
-0.01 
0.37 
-0.11 
0.03 
0.36 
      
3 -0.11 
-0.09 
0.29 
-0.10 
-0.02 
0.37 
-0.10 
0.06 
0.36 
-0.11 
0.11 
0.33 
     
4 -0.07 
0.10 
0.29 
-0.07 
0.10 
0.36 
-0.07 
0.24 
0.35 
-0.07 
0.34 
0.33 
-0.08 
0.36 
0.36 
    
5 -0.04 
0.24 
0.27 
-0.06 
0.20 
0.35 
-0.05 
0.34 
0.33 
-0.05 
0.43 
0.31 
-0.06 
0.47 
0.34 
-0.10 
0.52 
0.42 
   
6 -0.01 
0.53 
0.22 
-0.04 
0.38 
0.32 
-0.04 
0.49 
0.31 
-0.04 
0.59 
0.28 
-0.05 
0.65 
0.30 
-0.07 
0.71 
0.37 
-0.07 
0.82 
0.35 
  
7 0.01 
1.36 
0.07 
-0.02 
1.03 
0.19 
-0.03 
1.04 
0.18 
-0.02 
1.16 
0.15 
-0.03 
1.23 
0.17 
-0.05 
1.27 
0.21 
-0.05 
1.39 
0.21 
-0.05 
1.48 
0.20 
 
8 -0.09 
1.43 
0.11 
-0.09 
1.16 
0.17 
-0.10 
1.20 
0.15 
-0.10 
1.34 
0.11 
-0.09 
1.37 
0.09 
-0.11 
1.45 
0.12 
-0.11 
1.57 
0.08 
-0.11 
1.62 
0.07 
-0.11 
1.65 
0.06 
Notes: significance determined by robust standard errors, coded as follows: 
Bold and italic: significantly different from zero at 1% significance level 
Bold: significantly different from zero at 5% level 
Italic: significantly different from zero at 10% level 
Regular: not significantly different from zero at 10% level 
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TABLE 2.9: RMSE and LM statistics for the ex ante forecast approach 
 
RMSE 
LM 
(Prob.Chi -
square ) 
k=0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
j=0 0.302 
0.53 
        
1 0.303 
0.560 
0.254 
0.969 
       
2 0.308 
0.322 
0.254 
0.964 
0.256 
0.745 
      
3 0.307 
0.388 
0.254 
0.976 
0.255 
0.783 
0.274 
0.186 
     
4 0.303 
0.502 
0.253 
0.994 
0.248 
0.746 
0.261 
0.168 
0.273 
0.124 
    
5 0.299 
0.361 
0.250 
0.855 
0.243 
0.599 
0.255 
0.138 
0.266 
0.106 
0.271 
0.137 
   
6 0.288 
0.206 
0.244 
0.648 
0.237 
0.521 
0.249 
0.145 
0.258 
0.121 
0.261 
0.144 
0.283 
0.101 
  
7 0.231 
0.206 
0.212 
0.358 
0.211 
0.490 
0.215 
0.294 
0.217 
0.313 
0.214 
0.349 
0.219 
0.322 
0.223 
0.258 
 
8 0.217 
0.550 
0.206 
0.585 
0.213 
0.583 
0.219 
0.733 
0.218 
0.569 
0.221 
0.640 
0.223 
0.629 
0.224 
0.649 
0.225 
0.665 
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2.4. Comparisons and comments 
Section 2.3.1 established three points on the standard GMM approach. First, this 
approach produces the best fits for horizons of three or four quarters on inflation and 
one quarter on the output gap, horizons which are broadly in line with those commonly 
used in this literature but are not in line with the horizons implied by the Bank of 
England’s understanding of the transmission mechanism or, more generally, by its 
typical emphasis on the inflation forecast two years out. Second, this approach treats the 
relatively high values for the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable which it 
obtains as implying a high degree of interest rate smoothing; such smoothing is also 
inconsistent with statements made by those involved in or close to the decision-making 
process at the Bank. Third, the results at nearly all horizons suffer from the weak 
instruments problem, which means that the distributions of the estimators and the test 
statistics may be distorted, and that conventional inference may be invalid.  
Section 2.3.2 established two corresponding points for the ex ante forecast approach. 
First, this approach produces the best fits for horizons of seven or eight quarters for 
inflation and one quarter for output growth: this inflation horizon is clearly consistent 
with the Bank’s own view of its activities, while the output growth horizon (when 
output growth is seen as a forward indicator of the output gap, which in turn affects 
inflation with a lag of around four quarters) seems broadly plausible. Second, when the 
equation is estimated in terms of the first difference of the interest rate as the dependent 
variable, lags of the change in interest rates are not significant, which suggests that there 
is no ‘gradualism’ in UK monetary policy. Moreover, although the econometrics (as 
opposed to the data used) are much simpler in this case, the approach does not seem to 
suffer from any obvious econometric shortcoming. 
Before I proceed to explain the different best fits suggested by two methods, I should 
make it clear that the best fits for the horizons do not suggest that policy makers don't 
look at other forward projections. Actually the MPC published ex post forecasts for 
inflation and output growth from 0 quarter ahead to 8 quarters ahead. And in the 
transmission mechanism report released by the BoE, it clarified that policy makers 
realized it takes time for an official rate change to have its full impact. For some 
transmission channels the influence is quick (like wholesale money-market interest rates) 
and for some it takes longer term (like mortgage interest rates). The empirical evidence 
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suggested that it takes one year for a monetary policy change to reach its peak effect on 
production and another year for the peak effect on inflation. Thus it is expected that the 
'best fits' horizons chosen by the regressions, which suggests strongest and clearest 
reaction, should be where the interest rate decision impacts the economy fully.  And this 
impact would develop gradually from the time of the interest rate decision. We cannot 
effectively regress the policy rate on the forecasts for each variable at each horizon in 
the same regression, However, we can do a systematic analysis of the reaction of the 
policy rate to each pair of horizons, and this will show which pair are seen as most 
important by the policymakers. I would expect the finding to be related to the BoE's 
published views on the transmission mechanism and its general emphasis on the 
forecasts two years ahead. 
The most likely explanation of the differences between the two reaction functions is that 
the ex ante forecast approach employs something close to the actual forecasts produced 
by the central bank, 21 using the wide array of different information at its disposal 
together with the judgments of its forecasters, whereas the standard approach uses a 
limited set of instruments to generate implicit forecasts in a more mechanical way so 
that its implicit forecasts are much less close to what the policymakers were considering. 
While it is not possible to back out the exact forecasts implied by the GMM approach, I 
can run OLS regressions for inflation as a function of all the instruments included in our 
GMM model, and use the result to predict the forecasts for inflation at different 
horizons (this is equivalent to carrying out the first stage of an IV procedure). Figure 2.2 
graphs the four quarter ahead and eight quarter ahead ‘instrument forecasts’ for inflation 
generated in this way, together with the ex ante forecasts.22 It is immediately apparent 
that the instrument forecasts are not close to the ex ante forecasts, particularly in the 
later part of the period; the correlation between the instrument and ex ante forecasts is 
0.33 for four quarters ahead and 0.23 for eight quarters ahead. The implication is that 
the GMM model is trying to relate the policy rate to something which is quite distant 
                                                             
21 A possible alternative explanation for the superior performance of the ex ante forecast approach 
might be that it uses additional information, in the form of the MPC’s knowledge of its own likely 
changes in policy over the horizon period. But the ex post forecasts we use are those made on the 
assumption of constant interest rates, so in this sense they are comparable to those implied in the 
standard approach. 
22 For purposes of comparison we have reduced the ex ante forecasts for inflation up to February 
2004 by 0.5% in order to ‘convert’ them from RPIX forecasts (on a target of 2.5%) to CPI forecasts 
(on a target of 2%), since the GMM model uses the CPI throughout. It should be noted that we 
cannot carry out the same exercise for output, because the standard approach uses the output gap and 
the ex ante forecasts are for output growth. 
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from the forecasts which the policymakers were considering, and that would explain 
why it performs poorly.  
With respect to interest rate smoothing the conventional intuition for this is that the 
policymaker decides that the interest rate needs to be changed by a certain amount, but 
chooses to spread that change over a number of periods. This intuition suggests 
precisely that the change in the interest rate should be related to the previous period 
change (rather than that the level of the interest rate should be related to its previous 
level, which is the form used in the standard approach and identified there as interest 
rate smoothing). In that sense the intuition is better tested by the inclusion of the lagged 
change in the interest rate in a reaction function which has the change in the rate as the 
dependent variable, than by including the lagged level of the rate in a regression with 
the rate on the left hand side. But when smoothing is tested in this way in the ex ante 
forecast approach, it is rejected.  
 
 
Figure 2.2(a): Instrument and ex ante forecasts of inflation four quarters ahead 
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Figure 2.2(b): Instrument and ex ante forecasts of inflation eight quarters ahead 
 
 
 
The implications of the two different approaches for the issue of smoothing can be 
elucidated by considering the adjustment of the interest rate over time to an inflation 
shock which, once it occurs, is recognised and expected with certainty to continue. 
Figure 2.3 graphs the cumulative rise in the interest rate in response to a (continuing) 1% 
rise in expected inflation, everything else remaining equal, for the best fit on the 
standard approach (k = 1, j = 4). It takes between five and six quarters for the nominal 
interest rate to rise by 1%, i.e. for the real interest rate to exceed its initial pre-shock 
level.23 This is disturbing: the outcome for inflation over the period considered here 
suggests that policy was in fact being operated in a stabilising manner (and/or that the 
Taylor Principle was fulfilled), but such slow adjustment of the interest rate appears to 
mean that inflation shocks had time and scope to destabilise the economy before policy 
reasserted itself. In the ex ante forecast approach (for the best fit case of j = 1 and k = 8), 
on the other hand, the interest rate rises in the first quarter by 1.16% so that the real 
interest rate exceeds its initial level by the end of the first quarter. 
 
                                                             
23 Within the current framework we cannot calculate the response of the economy (or inflation) to the 
interest rate change. But insofar as the rise in the interest rate leads to reductions in expected 
inflation and the output gap, the rise in the interest rate will be slower and/or smaller. 
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Figure 2.3: The policy rate response to a rise in inflation 
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Figure 2.4 sheds some further light on the standard approach. It shows the actual policy 
rate together with the predicted desired rate r*, which can be backed out from the 
regression using equation (2.6),  and the predicted short run rate, that is the predicted 
value of the dependent variable in the regression of equation (2.5). It is immediately 
apparent that the desired rate has a very poor fit with the actual rate, and that the much 
better fit of the short run rate relies heavily on the lagged dependent variable (which, 
given the magnitude of its coefficient, accounts for some 89% of the short run rate). In 
particular there are large fluctuations in the desired rate in 1999, 2001-2, 2003-4 and 
2005-6 which leave almost no trace on the much more stable short run rate.  
Figure 2.4: Actual, predicted desired (r*) and predicted short run policy rates 
 
 
 
2.5. Estimates for the ex ante approach on the ECB 
The ECB released an article on its monetary policy transmission mechanism in the ECB 
Monthly Bulletin in 2000, one and a half years after the ECB took responsibility of 
conducting monetary policy for the euro area. Compared with the monetary policy 
operations and transmission mechanism of the BoE, there are several points in common. 
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First, the ECB adjusts the official interest rate, which is referred to as the main 
refinancing rate, with a view to keeping prices stable. Although there is a reference 
value for broad money in the ECB, while it was ignored by the BoE, there was debate, 
in the period before unconventional monetary policy, as to whether money plays an 
active role or passive role in the policy of the ECB. (See ECB Monthly Bulletin, July 
2000:46) As for the ambiguous role of money, the policy makers in the ECB neither 
dismissed it nor emphasized it in the transmission process. 24On the other hand, the 
policy rate is the instrument policy makers use to influence the economy, as at the BoE. 
In their analysis of the transmission mechanism, the effect on macroeconomic activity 
starts from the change in the policy rate and then leads to changes in financial markets. 
Thus studying the change in policy rate, as I have done for the UK, is an important 
aspect in research on the monetary policy of the ECB. Secondly, it is emphasized in the 
article that there are lags before the policy changes pass through to macroeconomic 
activity and the setting of the monetary policy needs to be forward-looking .For the euro 
area, the change in the policy interest rate will first influence financial market 
conditions through several intertwined channels and then lead to changes in spending 
and the price level. Based on the transmission mechanism and some existing work on 
the effects of policy changes, a simple VAR model indicated a temporary fall in output 
after two quarters as a response to a 25 basis point rise in the interest rate. And the 
inflation rate started to fall after 6 quarters. (ECB Monthly Bulletin, July 2000:56) For 
the Bank of England these two time lags have been put at one year and two years, 
respectively.  
As the ECB’s monetary policy framework is similar to that of the BoE in some aspects, 
it is possible to estimate a policy reaction function, in which the interest rate responds to 
the deviation of inflation forecast and output gap forecast from their targets directly, 
rather than using GMM method. The biggest difficulty in doing so is how to calculate 
the ‘ex-ante projections’ for the ECB. In contrast to the Bank of England, the ECB does 
                                                             
24 Gerlach and Svensson (2000) found that the money gap indicates future inflation but they also 
argued that this does not justify the prominent role of money in the strategy. See Monetary Policy in 
the Euro Area: strategy and decision-making at the European Central Bank : p.89. 
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not publish explicit projections of inflation and GDP growth for each quarter in the next 
two years. Their staff projections are only available for calendar years and are hard to 
use in estimating horizons. However, the ECB has conducted a Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF) every quarter since 1999 to capture private sector expectations of 
macroeconomic variables. These expectations in the survey could be used as proxies in 
estimating the reaction function of the ECB. Frank Smets, who is Director General of 
the Directorate General Research of the ECB, has used the SPF projections instead of 
staff projections to estimate the ECB’s policy reaction function. In his work, he used a 
simple rule proposed by Orphanides (2003) to illustrate how the ECB reacts to 
economic activity. The right-hand-side variables in the regression are the deviations of 
the SPF inflation forecast and deviations of the SPF output growth forecast. What’s 
more, he calculated the desired policy rate by using the estimated parameters and found 
it captured the actual ECB’s policy rate well. He suggests that “the correlation between 
the SPF forecasts and the corresponding ECB projections is very high so that similar 
findings are obtained”. (See Smets 2010: 274) Under this ‘official’ suggestion, it is 
plausible to use SPF projections in the ex-ante forecast approach. 
However, the SPF is not a perfect replacement for policy makers’ projections. There are 
several issues in using it before I start the estimation. First, the SPF is conducted in the 
second half of the first month of each quarter, and it is independent of the interest rate 
setting process of the next month, most of which occurs at the beginning of that month. 
So those SPF projections are ex-ante projections rather than ex-post projections with 
respect to the decisions of the next month at least. Thus there is no need to extract the 
influence of the interest rate change from the SPF projections in the way in which this 
has been done for the ex-post projections in the UK.  Second, it is not possible to be 
sure about the assumptions the participants were making when they answered the survey. 
In the UK case, the forecasts are made by the policy makers on a constant interest rate 
assumption. For the Euro Area, the Governing Council of the ECB generally decides the 
main refinancing rate in the first meeting of every month. When the participants in the 
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survey make their projections at the end of the first month,25 they can either assume the 
policy rate is held constant, or they can forecast changes in the policy rate over the next 
two years and take these changes into consideration in making their inflation projections. 
Several of the surveys during 1999 and 2007 were even conducted at the same time as 
the interest rate decision meeting. There is no way to know how the participants took 
any changes made at that time into consideration.  
Though there are drawbacks in using SPF projections, it is still worth trying to estimate 
the reaction function of the ECB with them. As in the UK case, I use the interest rate 
decision in the month when the SPF is published (the month after the SPF is conducted) 
as the policy rate level in that quarter, which responds to the deviation of the inflation 
forecast from target and to output growth. The results are shown in Table 2.10.  
The SPF only supplies projections at one-year and two-year horizons. Therefore the 
estimation can only be undertaken for the time horizons where j=4, 8 and k=4, 8. As 
there are no projections for current inflation and GDP growth (j=0 and k=0), I use actual 
data to estimate how the policy rates respond to the variables at these horizons.26 What’s 
more, due to the fact that current GDP data is not available when the interest rate is 
made, the GDP growth in the previous quarter is the latest GDP data policy makers have. 
Estimations on lagged GDP growth reflect the attitudes of the policy makers to current 
available information. The inflation in the euro area is measured by the Harmonised 
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) and the GDP growth rate is calculated from the 
annual difference of the log of the chained volume of GDP. The interest rate is the main 
refinancing rate. The target rates are taken to be 2% and 2.25% in HICP and GDP 
growth respectively.27  
                                                             
25 Since 2002, the survey has been conducted regularly at the end of Jan, Apr, Jul and Oct. Before 
that, it was conducted mostly at the beginning of Feb, May, Aug and Nov.  
26 Real Time Database of the ECB supplies the historical vintages of the data. The preliminary 
estimate of inflation generally comes out two months after while that of GDP comes out one or two 
quarters after. The revisions were made successively but very small.  
27 These targets are indicated in Monthly Bulletin and some working papers. If they were not right, 
they are still constant through the period. Which means the ‘error’ from the targets would affect only 
the estimate of the constant in the regression.  
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Table 2.10(a) shows the estimate of equation (2.11) for the ECB. The coefficient of 
inflation b increases from the north-west to the south-east of the table. In every column, 
as the horizon of inflation increases from 0 to 8, b increases. When k=0, the largest 
value of b is 0.96 at j=8. When the horizon of GDP growth increases too, the estimate of 
b can be 1.57 at the maximum. The coefficient of GDP growth c, on the other hand, 
does not always increase when the horizons change. It is clear that when k varies from -
1 to 4, c increases on each of j=0, j=4 and j=8. And these estimates are all significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level. However, when k becomes 8, the estimate of c falls 
back to a lower level and it is not significantly different from zero at the 10% 
significance level.  
Table 2.10 (a): Estimates of a, b and c by the ex ante forecast approach for the 
ECB 
 
a 
b 
c 
K=-1 k=0 4 8 
j=0 0.03 
-0.004 
0.18 
0.02 
0.09 
0.22 
  
4 0.09 
0.25 
0.16 
0.09 
0.26 
0.20 
0.20 
0.56 
0.35 
 
8 0.20 
0.94 
0.17 
0.21 
0.96 
0.21 
0.32 
1.33 
0.37 
0.29 
1.57 
0.20 
Notes: significance determined by robust standard errors, coded as follows: 
Bold and italic: significantly different from zero at 1% significance level 
Bold: significantly different from zero at 5% level 
Italic: significantly different from zero at 10% level 
Regular: not significantly different from zero at 10% level 
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Table 2.10 (b): RMSE and LM statistics  
 
RMSE 
LM(4) 
(Prob.Chi -square ) 
K=-1 k=0 4 8 
j=0 0.274 
0.11 
0.235 
0.21 
  
4 0.270 
0.10 
0.234 
0.22 
0.257 
0.43 
 
8 0.263 
0.14 
0.225 
0.36 
0.253 
0.36 
0.321 
0.01 
 
Table 2.10(b) reports the corresponding RMSE and LM statistics. The RMSEs are in the 
range of 0.22 to 0.27 except the one at j=8, k=8, which is above 0.30. When k’s value is 
fixed, the RMSE decreases as j increases in every column. When comparing the RMSE 
in different columns, it suggests that the RMSE drops from k=-1 to k=0 but then goes 
up when k=4. The smallest RMSE, indicated by the table, is the one when j=8 and k=0. 
The LM statistics also report no serial correlation except where j=8 and k=8.  
Though it is hard to choose a ‘best-fit’ estimate due to the small number of forecast 
horizons given by the SPF, it is still possible to limit the range of it from the results in 
Table 2.10. As the RMSE decreases as k changes from -1 to 0 and increases as k 
increases from 0 to 8, the k=0 group of RMSEs indicates a better fit of the equation than 
the groups for other values of k. And in this column, the RMSE reaches its lowest level 
at j=8. So the most-possible horizons should be around j=8 and k=0. What is more, as 
the RMSE appears to have a “ U-shape” from 0.263 to 0.225 then to 0.253 when k goes 
from -1 to 4, it is hard to judge where the lowest value of the RMSE lies. It is possible 
that from k=0 to 4, the RMSE decreases first in k=1,2,3 which we can not assess in this 
table and then increases again to a higher level. Thus I cannot reject the possibility that 
the ‘best-fit’ appears at j=8 and k=1,2,3. As the value of b increases from 0.94 to 1.57 as 
k becomes larger, the interest rate adjustment is strong enough to offset the inflation 
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pressure in the economy. What has to be emphasized here is that even k=0 does not 
mean the policy makers don’t look forward on GDP growth. As what is well known, the 
data of GDP growth is hardly collected until the following quarter and the real-time data 
will only be available at least by that time. When SPF is conducted in the first month of 
the quarter, the information given to the participants is for GDP growth two quarters 
before. Thus I believe that when policy makers make interest rate decisions, the GDP 
data they have should be earlier than the GDP growth at k=0 in the estimation. Thus the 
GDP growth at k=0, which is actually calculated at a later time after the current quarter, 
should be taken as a forward-looking GDP one or two quarters ahead rather than the 
current figure.  
Given the difficulty in knowing exactly what survey participants know and assume at 
the time of the survey, in addition to the results reported in Table 2.10, I also considered 
a different timing. The interest rate level I used in the regression this time, which 
responds to the SPF in that quarter, is the interest of the month which the forecast 
survey is made. In another word, the interest rate in the new estimation is one month 
earlier than the interest rate used previously. Table 2.11 show the results of the 
estimation. Generally speaking, the values of b and c in this table are quite close to 
results in Table 2.10. In Table 2.11(a), the values of b increase slightly than that in Table 
2.10(a) at every horizon. When j increases from 0 to 8, the values of b increase 
gradually until they are around 1 and are significantly different from 0 at 5% 
significance level when k=-1,0 and at 1% level when k=4,8. The values of c are very 
similar to the previous estimations, which vary from 0.16 to 0.41. And the RMSE values 
in Table 2.11(b), however, indicate a better fit at j=4 and k=4, compare to the j=8 and 
k=0 in Table 2.10(b).  
Though I have tried regressions with different timing, the latter results are less relevant 
to my question than the earlier set. In the earlier case the forecasts are clearly before, 
that is ex ante to, the policy decisions being considered, but in the latter case the 
forecasts may be partly ex post. For the ECB, there is some evidence that the short-term 
interest rate typically moves in advance of the main refinancing rate. (ECB Monthly 
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Bulletin, July 2000: 48, Chart 2) That might suggest that when the private sector makes 
its forecasts in the first month of the quarter, it is very likely to consider the possibility 
of an interest rate change in the second month, which is when the staff projections are 
made and the SPF projections are published. Thus though the interest rate used in the 
second set of estimation is the interest rate from the time when the SPF projections are 
actually made, the timing in the first set of estimations is much closer to what is meant 
by the ex ante forecast. So the first set of estimations is the preferred one.  
From the estimates above, I suppose that the interest rate change in the Euro Area 
responds to the inflation projection 8 quarters ahead and GDP growth one or two 
quarters ahead. This suggestion is close to what the VAR model estimate indicates in a 
book published by the ECB in 2003 which summarised the research on the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism in the euro area (See Peersman and Smets, 2003). And it 
is also close to the pattern of the policy making process pronounced by the ECB in 2000.  
Table 2.11 (a): Estimates of a,b,c by using rate at different timing 
 
a 
b 
c 
K=-1 k=0 4 8 
j=0 0.03 
-0.02 
0.18 
0.02 
0.10 
0.22 
  
4 0.12 
0.41 
0.16 
0.13 
0.43 
0.19 
0.23 
0.70 
0.39 
 
8 0.20 
0.93 
0.17 
0.21 
0.96 
0.20 
0.32 
1.34 
0.41 
0.30 
1.63 
0.23 
Notes: significance determined by robust standard errors, coded as follows: 
Bold and italic: significantly different from zero at 1% significance level 
Bold: significantly different from zero at 5% level 
Italic: significantly different from zero at 10% level 
Regular: not significantly different from zero at 10% level 
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Table 2.11 (b): RMSEs and LM statistics 
 
RMSE 
LM(4) 
(Prob.Chi -square ) 
K=-1 k=0 4 8 
j=0 0.263 
0.34 
0.229 
0.27 
  
4 0.254 
0.27 
0.221 
0.29 
0.215 
0.37 
 
8 0.252 
0.40 
0.220 
0.41 
0.224 
0.27 
0.312 
0.02 
 
 
 
2.6. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have contrasted the standard GMM approach to estimating the 
monetary policy reaction function pioneered by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) to the 
ex ante forecast approach developed by Goodhart (2005), which requires only simple 
OLS estimation, for the case of the Bank of England. It turns out that the latter produces 
a picture of monetary policy which is much closer to the Bank’s own description of 
what it does, both in terms of the time horizons which give the best fit and in terms of 
the absence of gradualism, while the former suffers from econometric weaknesses in the 
form of weak instruments. The most likely explanation of these differences is that the ex 
ante forecast approach employs the actual forecasts produced by the central bank, using 
the wide array of different information at its disposal together with the judgments of its 
forecasters, whereas the standard approach uses a more limited set of instruments to 
generate implicit forecasts in a more mechanical way. 
The implication is that economists who want to understand the policy process should try 
to apply the ex ante forecast method where possible. At present, few central banks 
publish forecasts that can be used in this way. This is unfortunate, for the standard 
approach is a very poor alternative. However, central banks must have the information 
required: in the name of transparency and in order for their decision-making to be better 
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understood, they could perhaps publish it retrospectively. 
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Chapter 3: Unconventional Policy and Broad Money 
3.1. The Adoption of Unconventional Monetary Policy 
3.1.1. Financial Crisis and Unconventional Monetary Policy 
Under the policy reaction function and the transmission mechanism published on the 
official website of the Bank of England, the Monetary Policy Committee had adjusted 
the bank rate to a level of 5.75% in the fall of 2007 following a series of rises since 
2003. As suggested in chapter 1, the interest rate adjustment is based on the projection 
of inflation 2 years ahead and the projection of output 1 year ahead. Though the global 
credit crisis had broken out in 2007, the MPC decided to raise the interest rate a little to  
5.75% as the projections made at that time indicated a continuous growth of output and 
an inflation with upside risks.28 The interest rate after that was not cut dramatically until 
the autumn of 2008 when the crisis intensified and it fell from 5% to 0.5% in the space 
of half year. The prospects for economic activity worsened for the following several 
years. In the inflation report released at the beginning of the big rate-cut, the Governor 
suggested that the economy had entered a recession and the forecasts of GDP and 
inflation were weaker than the previous projections. Under circumstances where the 
outlook for inflation had changed substantially, the MPC kept on cutting the interest rate 
until it reached 0.5% in March 2009. Monetary policy during this period was still being 
operated as in the previous years, that is in a forward-looking manner and targeting 
inflation by setting the interest rate. This strategy of monetary policy is commonly 
thought of as ‘conventional monetary policy’.  
The interest rate had been close to the ‘zero lower bound’ at the beginning of 2009 when 
the prospects for GDP and inflation were still negative. In the inflation report of the 
BoE in February 2009, the forecast percentage increase in output had been negative and 
the forecast of inflation in two years’ time was under the target level of 2%.29 Besides 
                                                             
28 The press release from the Bank of England lists the reasons of interest rate decision. See 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2007/070.aspx 
29 This is partly because of the VAT cut 
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the UK, economic activity in other regions, such as the US and the Euro Area, was also 
low though their central banks had decreased their policy rates as well. At this stage, 
interest rates could not be adjusted further to encourage the medium term inflation in the 
light of the global recession and other actions were needed to supplement the 
conventional policy.30 In March 2009, the MPC of the BoE announced its decision to 
introduce the ‘unconventional monetary policy’ of quantitative easing (QE): it cut the 
policy rate to what it believed was the minimum feasible of 0.5% and “also resolved to 
undertake further monetary actions, with the aim of boosting the supply of money and 
credit and thus raising the rate of growth of nominal spending to a level consistent with 
meeting the inflation target in the medium term”.31  
The Federal Reserve also introduced quantitative easing at the start of 2009 by 
purchasing Treasury securities “to help improve conditions in private credit markets”, 
while an earlier paper by Bernanke and Reinhart (2004: 87) had referred to changing the 
size of a central bank’s balance sheet (i.e. QE) as “buying or selling securities to affect 
the overall supply of reserves and the money stock”. The Banque de France in its 2010 
study identifies one category of non-conventional monetary policy measures as 
“achieving a massive increase in the quantity of money circulating in the economy. This 
is called ‘quantitative easing’” (Banque de France, 2010: 45). 
3.1.2. Broad Money in Quantitative Easing 
When the policy makers around the world took the decisions on quantitative easing, 
they were thinking not only of Japan’s deflation problem in the 1990s and 2000s and 
Japan’s first use of quantitative easing, but also of the role of monetary contraction in 
the Great Depression. Chairman Bernanke had of course studied that episode (see his 
2004 book) and was familiar with the argument (which goes back to Friedman and 
                                                             
30 The Committee considered a further reduction in the bank rate might have inverse impact on the 
economy. If the banks passed the cuts in bank rate to their deposit rates, they might reduce lending. 
And what’s more, sustained low interest rate may harm the functioning of money market.  
31 Press statement 5 March 2009, available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2009/019.htm. See also the Minutes of the MPC 
meeting at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/pdf/2009/mpc0903.pdf. 
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Schwartz, 1960) that the money stock was allowed to fall too much in the early 1930s 
and this contributed to the depth and length of the depression. Governor King had 
earlier argued explicitly that it “is crucial to look at developments in quantities in the 
monetary area and credit conditions, as well as prices… My own belief is that the 
absence of money in the standard models which economists use will cause problems in 
the future…” (King, 2002: 172-3). 
However, the two principal pieces of early research to have come out of the Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of England (BoE) on quantitative easing focused on the effects of 
QE on long-term interest rates, and made little reference to money or credit.32 Gagnon, 
Raskin, Remache and Sack (2010) used event study and time-series analysis and found 
that yields on US long term Treasury bonds fell in response to large scale asset 
purchases by 50-100 basis points (in the event study) or 38-82 bps (in the time-series 
analysis). Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens and Tong (2010) also used event study and time-
series analysis, and found falls in yields on UK gilts of 50-100 bps.33 Moreover, these 
papers do not go on to link the fall in yields to the development of economic activity (or 
inflation).34 
This disconnect between the policy announcements of the Fed and the BoE and the 
main research coming out of these institutions is surely disturbing. The absence of 
money and credit from mainstream empirical research is clearly the result of the way 
                                                             
32 On the other hand a number of papers published in the Bank’s Quarterly Bulletin, including Bell 
and Young (2010) and Bridges, Rossiter and Thomas (2011), discussed the evolution of money and 
credit in some detail. See also the sections on ‘Money and asset prices’ of the various Inflation 
Reports over the period. I draw on this work below. The Bank’s view of the transmission mechanism 
(Benford, Berry, Nikolov, Young and Robson (2009) also sees a clear intermediate role for money in 
QE. 
33 Joyce et al. discuss QE as a swap between money and gilts in their section 6, but they do this only 
as an alternative way of estimating the effect on long term yields. 
34 On the other hand, a related paper which follows the effects through to the real economy is that by 
Lenza et al (2010), who investigate the effects of (non-QE) unconventional monetary policies in the 
euro area. They consider a ‘no-policy’ counterfactual scenario in which spreads between 3- and 12-
month EURIBOR and the euro overnight index average EONIA remain the same as in October 2008, 
and a ‘policy’ scenario in which these spreads move as they did in fact move, over November 2008 
to August 2009. In the policy scenario spreads are significantly lower. They then use these interest 
rate spreads to simulate in a large scale VAR model the development of variables including industrial 
production, unemployment, inflation, bank lending and money, under each scenario. Overall, the 
exercise seems to indicate that the policy measures mitigated the crisis and the recession. 
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macroeconomics has developed over the last two decades, with the New Keynesian and 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models that came to be dominant including an 
interest rate but leaving no space for any monetary or credit aggregate, as in Woodford 
(2003). The main reasons for ignoring the aggregates are, first, that if money demand is 
a stable function of a small number of variables (as in Friedman, 1956) then data on 
money supply will not provide any information additional to that incorporated in data 
on the arguments of money demand, that is income, prices and interest rates; and, 
second, that the money supply is endogenously determined within the financial system 
and via its interactions with the real economy, through the kind of portfolio adjustment 
mechanisms first set out by Tobin (1963), so that it has no independent causal role.  
A small number of economists have continued to argue that some attention at least 
should be paid to monetary aggregates. Laidler (2006: 158) in his review of Woodford’s 
paper argued that Woodford’s theory was “well adapted to teaching us how to sail in 
already calm monetary conditions, in fair fiscal weather and in the confined waters of a 
closed economy”. And Goodhart (2007) argued that the relegation of money had gone 
too far, emphasizing the importance of supply-side (as opposed to demand-side) shocks 
to money and the possibility of shifts in banks’ willingness to supply loans. More 
recently Driffill and Miller (2010) have used the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) 
to underpin an analytical model in which liquidity constraints (which can be seen as a 
manifestation of financial crisis) turn out to have a large impact on economic activity.  
This chapter asks whether broad money might have had independent causal effects in 
the current period and whether a stronger focus on it might not help us to understand 
QE better. 35  I firstly construct a simple SVAR model to estimate the response of 
inflation and output to a shock to broad money. This model has been widely used in 
recent work, and by doing so, I can get a general indication of impact of QE on 
economic activity. Then for further analysis, I use the once well-known flow of funds 
                                                             
35 There is a parallel in intention between our work and that of Giannone et al. (2011), but they have 
the advantage of being able to use the 32-variable VAR model of Giannone et al. (2009) which 
includes monetary and credit aggregates as well as standard macro variables. 
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framework to discuss the mechanics of financial crisis, fiscal expansion and QE. In 
section 3.4.1 I look at the relevant data for the UK over the last 3-4 years. In section 
3.4.2 I report the results of a simple reduced-form regression of the relationship between 
nominal spending growth and nominal money growth using interacted dummies for the 
crisis period. In sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 I illustrate the striking results of that regression 
by using appropriate counterfactuals to consider what they imply first for the 
contribution of the financial crisis to the path of spending in 2008-9, and then for the 
contribution of QE in 2009-10. Section 3.5 concludes by arguing that this investigation 
should be taken further by the introduction of monetary and/or credit aggregates in 
some form into existing large-scale macroeconometric models of the UK. 
3.2. A Structural VAR Estimation of the Impact of QE 
Although most empirical work on QE has focused on the impact on financial markets 
since the announcement of QE, there are several papers released after 2011 which have 
extended their estimate to the impact of QE on the macroeconomy. Bridges and Thomas 
(2012) used an aggregate co-integrated SVAR model to establish the impact of QE on 
asset prices and nominal spending. They assumed that QE brought about an 8% increase 
in broad money which should be considered as a shock to the money supply. This shock 
brought yields down around 150 basis points. And in their SVAR estimation, they found 
the peak effect of this 8% shock on output is around 2%, with an impact on inflation of 
1 percent. Another important paper examining the macroeconomic impact of QE is 
Kapetanios et al (2012). They focused on the transmission channel through which asset 
purchase affected lower long-term interest rates. Then they used three different models 
(BVAR, MS-SVAR and TVP-SVAR) to estimate the impact of QE on inflation and 
output. They suggested a peak effect on real GDP of 1.5% and on CPI of 1.25%.  
In this section, in order to have a general idea about the influence of QE on 
macroeconomic activity before the further analysis in section 3.3, I will use a simple 
Structural VAR model to estimate the impact. Drawing inspiration from the two papers 
above together with Dhar et al (2000), I construct a 4-variable simple SVAR. As the 
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purpose of this chapter is not to suggest a transmission channel, I don’t include any 
financial market variables in the model as the two papers above did. The variables in my 
estimation are inflation (π), real GDP (y), bank rate (r) and real money (m), three of 
which are used in estimations of Taylor Rule reaction functions. The purpose of the 
estimation is to study directly the influence of monetary shocks on macroeconomic 
activity. The SVAR model can be expressed as: 
Yt = α1Yt−1 + α2Yt−2 + ⋯+ αpYt−p + εt                                  (3.1) 
Where 𝑌𝑡 = (𝜋𝑡, 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑟𝑡,𝑚𝑡)’ 
The shocks in the SVAR model in this section are all temporary shocks: a shock to 
inflation (μUR), an aggregate demand shock (μAD), a monetary policy shock (μPL) and a 
“QE-like shock” (μQE).  The QE-like shock is created by Bridges and Thomas (2012), 
this shock by assuming that it does not have an instant impact on inflation and GDP or 
the short-term rate, but has an impact on money, long-term rates and the exchange rate. 
In my estimation here, as the exchange rate and long-term rate are excluded from the 
simple SVAR, I assume that the QE-like shock only has an instant impact on money. 
Because the bank rate has been restricted to the 0.5% level since 2009, and the timing 
assumption implies lags for the transmission to output and inflation, the QE-like shock 
has zero impact on the other three variables at the time when the shock happens. 
Following Dhar et al (2000), the other shocks are a monetary policy shock, an aggregate 
demand shock and an unrestricted shock. Under monetary policy shocks, money and 
Bank rate change immediately while output and inflation will change with lags. The 
aggregate demand shock can’t impact inflation at the time of the shock. The unrestricted 
shock indicates that if there is a shock to inflation, all variables in the model will 
simultaneously react to it. Thus the short-run restrictions in SVAR could be shown as; 
�
πyrm� =  �
∗ 0
∗ ∗
0 00 0
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
∗ 0
∗ ∗
�  .�µURµADµPL
µQE
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Where μUR =unrestricted shock, μAD=aggregate demand shock, μPL = monetary policy 
shock, and μQE= QE-like shock. 
By choosing the smallest values of AIC and SC, I include three lags of variables in the 
model. Under this structure, no root lies outside the unit circle so the model satisfies the 
stability condition. The sample period is from the first quarter of 1994 to the end of 
2010. The data for inflation is the change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rate (since 
the year before), the level of GDP is the log of GDP volume, the interest rate is Bank 
rate and money is defined as M4ex-M4 excluding intermediate OFCs (the Bank’s 
preferred measure of broad money outstanding) deflated by the GDP deflator.36  
Figure 3.1: Impulse responses to QE-like shocks (shock 4 in the graphs) 
 
An impulse analysis is given in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.1 shows the responses of all 
                                                             
36 Though the Bank of England prefers M4ex as a measure of broad money now, it only supplies the 
data of M4ex back to 1998. The spread between M4 and M4ex increased heavily after 2003Q4 so 
M4 is not a good measure of broad money though it has a longer data. Because the spread was stable 
between 1998 and 2003Q3 at around 4.6% , I took the average value of the spread in this period and, 
under the assumption that the same spread existed before 1998, constructed data for M4ex before 
1998.  
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variables in the model to the QE-like shocks within the following 4 years. When the 
QE-like shock has one standard deviation, the real money immediately rises by 0.9%. 
This response decreases in the following periods until period 6 after which the response 
of the real money to the shock stays around 0.41%. Inflation starts to react to the shock 
after two quarters and has a positive response after 4 quarters. The peak positive effect 
of 4 basis points occurs two years after the shock. Though it is unclear why inflation 
decreases slightly at first, the response of inflation remains positive after one year. Real 
GDP responds to the shock with an increase which peaks at 0.16% in quarter 6. This 
increase gradually vanishes towards zero as the period gets longer. It is clear from the 
figure that GDP will return to its original level 4 years after the shock. The interest rate 
in this model has a negative response which lasts at least 4 years after the shock 
happens. 
Except for the response of money growth, it is hard to reject the proposition that all 
other three responses are not significantly different from zero, since the red bands which 
represent 2 standard errors include zero. It seems that it is hard to get clear evidence of 
the impact of money growth change on the macroeconomy directly by using this simple 
VAR. However, the shape of the central estimates of the responses in Figure 3.1 are in 
line with the results in Bridges and Thomas (2012) which considered exchange rate, 
various yields and asset prices in the model. The response of GDP in that model also 
peaked after four quarters and disappeared in the longer term. So it is still worth 
calculating the cumulative response by the central estimates. Based on the estimation in 
Figure 3.1 and the data on broad money since the implementation of QE, I calculate an 
estimate of the impact of QE on output and inflation. Figure 3.2 shows the Bank of 
England’s cumulative gilt purchases under the Asset Purchase Facility between March 
2009 and January 2010. By the end of the exercise the asset purchases had reached the 
scheduled £200bn, which amounted to about 13% of M4ex in March 2009 and nearly 
14% of nominal GDP in 2008. As this increase of 13% of broad money is accumulated 
quarter by quarter, the second and the third rows of Table 3.1 list the gilts purchased and 
the corresponding percentage change of M4ex. Considering the responses shown in 
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Figure 3.1, I estimate the impact on real GDP in 2010 is around 2.5% and the impact on 
inflation is 0.4%, as shown on the fourth and fifth rows of Table 3.1.37 
Table 3.1: The asset purchased and the sum effect on macroeconomic activity 
 09Q1 09Q2 09Q3 09Q4 10Q1 10Q2 10Q3 10Q4 
Gilt 
purchased 
£17.24 
billion 
£84.31 
billion 
£54.606 
billion 
£33.8 
billion 
£10.225 
billion 
0 0 0 
%of M4ex 1.14% 5.89% 4% 2.53% 0.76% 0 0  
Effect on 
GDP 
     2.3% 2.5% 2.5% 
Effect on 
CPI 
     0.06% 0.3% 0.45% 
 
Compared with the results in Bridges and Thomas (2012), the estimated impact on real 
GDP is a little higher while the impact on inflation is lower. But this gap is not big. 
Especially when Bridges and Thomas (2012) take uncertainty into consideration, my 
estimations38 fall in the range of their estimations.39 
 
                                                             
37 The way I calculate the impact of QE for one quarter is to sum up the effects brought by the 
continuous asset purchases before that quarter. Take 2010Q2 as an example. The effect on GDP in 
2010Q2 from the 1.14% increase in M4ex in 2009Q1 which is five quarters before is 
1.14*0.1688=0.19%. 0.1662 is given by the impulse response table. And the effect from 5.89% 
increase in M4ex in 2009Q2, 4% in 2009Q3,2.53% in 2009Q4,0.76% in 2010Q1 are 0.98%, 0.62%, 
0.28% and 0.03% respectively. Sum them together, I got the effect on GDP in 2010Q2 is around 
2.3%. 
38 The estimation of the impact on inflation in my SVAR model actually peaks in 2011 which is not 
shown in the table. It’s value is 0.6%.  
39 Bridges and Thomas (2012) produced estimates not only from their preferred model but also from 
sectoral models with uncertainty.  In their table 3 on p39, they give the estimation and the range of 
the impact on GDP as from 0.75% to 3.25% and the range of the impact on inflation is from 0.5% to 
2.25%.  
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Figure 3.2: Gilt purchases by BoE under APF 
 
 
This central estimation of a simple SVAR suggests how much macroeconomic activity 
would react to an exogenous shock to broad money. It indicates that QE’s influence is 
greater on GDP than on inflation and that the impact peaks in the sixth quarter. However, 
compared with other VAR estimates, it suffers the drawback that the estimates are 
insignificantly different from zero.  It might because the SVAR model is constructed 
under the consideration of interactions among variables but the fact is that money 
growth during the crisis period is only influenced by the exogenous QE-like shock and 
has little effect from other variables in the VAR. It is impossible to assess clear 
counterfactuals by using this SVAR model. What’s more, it can’t show the responses of 
every sector in the economy when shocks happened or any possible offset raised by 
those sectors to QE’s influence on broad money. The purpose of this chapter is not to 
compare different models or equations but to see if there is support for the goal 
pronounced by the BoE. Thus the estimated impact above needs support by further 
analysis. In the following sections, the mechanics of the shocks are explained and a 
naive reduced-form regression is used to indicate the impact.  
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3.3. The Mechanics of Crisis and Quantitative Easing 
As the a number of articles I mentioned in the last sections explored the effects of the 
crisis and then of QE through the counterparts of broad money, I will draw on their 
insights in what follows, but I first present a simple analysis of the ‘mechanics’ of 
financial crisis and QE in terms of a flow of funds matrix (Table 3.2) of the kind which 
used to be included in undergraduate macro textbooks (e.g. Artis and Lewis, 1991; 
Cobham, 1998) but is not generally familiar today. 
In Table 3.2 the columns represent different sectors of the economy: government, 
central bank, foreign, private non-financial (firms and households), and private financial 
(banks); while the rows represent first the financial surplus/deficit (net borrowing) of 
each sector (from the national income accounts) and then the changes in assets (positive) 
and in liabilities (negative) for each financial claim, e.g. deposits, government securities. 
Thus the columns show the balance sheet constraints for each sector, while the rows 
show the supply = demand conditions for each claim: each column and each row must 
sum to zero. In this simple presentation there are many assumed simplifications. For 
example, the central bank and the private financial sector are assumed to have no 
(physical) investment or saving (out of income); government securities are held only by 
domestic agents; non-financial corporate equity and bonds are issued and held within 
the private non-financial sector (so they are not visible); and contingent liabilities 
(derivatives) are not shown because they are off balance sheet.40 Moreover, what the 
table shows is essentially identities rather than behaviour. However, this framework is 
useful because it obliges us to think through the ramifications of any change: a change 
in one sector’s acquisition of a financial claim must involve some offsetting change in 
that column and in that row, and typically some further changes as well. 
The identities in the table can be manipulated (and this was often the main purpose of 
                                                             
40 The one significant difference from the table in Cobham (1998) is that the government and central 
bank are separated here, in the light of the modern focus on central bank independence and the need 
to locate QE within that context. 
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the exercise in the past) so as to derive the counterparts to broad money growth:41 
 ∆Ms =DEF-∆GDnf+∆A-∆NDL+∆RES 
where Ms is broad money supply, DEF is the government’s budget deficit, GDnf is the 
amount of government debt held by the private non-financial sector, A is banks’ lending 
(advances) to the private non-financial sector, NDL is banks’ non-deposit liabilities 
(mainly equity issued by the banks) and RES is the central bank (CB)’s foreign 
exchange reserves. This is broadly the credit counterparts to monetary growth as 
identified, for example, in Table A3.2 of the Bank of England’s Bankstats. But the flow 
of funds as a whole goes beyond that insofar as it represents the balance sheet 
constraints of the non-bank sectors as well. 
I now consider through this framework the proximate effects of a number of exogenous 
changes, as summarized in Table 3.3; the changes discussed are restricted to simple 
cases where there are ‘single-factor’ offsets, and the analysis focuses on first-round 
effects and ignores subsequent portfolio adjustments (many of which take place within 
the private non-financial sector). I start with more simple cases and build up to more 
interesting ones.42 The simplest change (row 1 of Table 3.3) is an increase in the central 
bank’s lending to the commercial banks (CBL): here the CB has a rise in its assets 
together with a rise in its liabilities (in the form of banks’ reserves at the CB), while the 
banks have a rise in their liabilities (CBL) and a rise in their assets (R). The result is that 
Ms is unchanged (neither notes and coin nor banks’ deposits are affected) but high-
powered money H increases. 
 
                                                             
41 To derive this, write each of the private non-financial column, the financial deficit row and the 
overseas column as equations: 
(I-S)+∆D+∆NDL+∆C+∆GDnf = ∆A+K  [A]  
DEF + (X-Z) + (I-S) = 0    [B]  
(X-Z) + K = ∆RES    [C]   
then substitute for I-S in [A] from [B], and for X-Z from [C] and use the definition ∆Ms=∆D+∆C. 
42 In the discussion that follows I talk of rises or falls in assets and liabilities, but strictly the changes 
are rises or falls in the flows into assets and liabilities, i.e. changes relative to whatever else is 
happening. 
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Table 3.2: Simplified flow of funds matrix  
 government central 
bank 
overseas private 
non-fin 
private 
financial 
total 
1) fin def G-T  X-Z I-S  0 
2) deposits    ∆D -∆D 0 
3) non-deposit 
liabilities 
   ∆NDL -∆NDL 0 
4) high-powered 
money 
 -∆H  ∆C ∆R 0 
5) government 
securities 
-∆GD ∆GDcb  ∆GDnf ∆GDf 0 
6) CB lending to 
banks 
 ∆CBL   -∆CBL 0 
7) domestic lending    -∆A ∆A 0 
8) foreign lending  ∆RES K-∆RES -K  0 
total 0 0 0 0 0  
 
Notes: G-T, X- Z (Z for imports) and I-S are the standard sectoral financial deficits as in 
the national income accounts; D and NDL are bank deposits and bank non-deposit 
liabilities respectively; H, C and R are high-powered money, notes and coin in 
circulation and banks’ reserves at the central bank; GD, GDcb, GDnf and GDf are the 
stock of government debt (securities) in existence, and the amounts held by the central 
bank, private non-financial and private financial sectors respectively; CBL is short term 
lending from central bank to commercial banks, i.e. ‘money market assistance’; A is 
bank lending (advances); K is capital inflows, and RES is the foreign exchange reserves. 
The change in high-powered money is equal to the change in notes and coin in 
circulation (∆C) plus the change in banks’ reserves at the central bank (∆R). The change 
in broad money is equal to the change in  notes and coin in circulation (∆C) plus the 
change in deposits (∆D).  
Row 2 of Table 3.3 shows the effect of the issuance of new equity and bonds by the 
banks: the banks incur more non-deposit liabilities but the payments for the new equity 
and bonds from the private non-financial sector reduce the amount of that sector’s bank 
deposits. The banks end up with less deposits but more non-deposit liabilities, while the 
private non-financial sector ends up with less deposits but more non-deposit claims on 
the banks. Thus M falls but H is unchanged 
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Row 3 considers the case of banks’ purchases of government securities (perhaps in 
order to increase their holdings of liquid assets) from the private non-financial sector. 
Here the two sectors swap government paper and deposits, in the opposite direction to 
the previous case. M rises but H is unchanged.  
Row 4 treats the case of a conventional fiscal expansion financed by a bond issue: there 
is an increase in the government’s budget deficit G-T to which I assume there a 
corresponding fall in the private sector’s deficit I-S (and no change in the current 
account X-F), together with an issue of bonds by the government. In this simple case the 
private non-financial sector ‘spends’ the additional resources from its increased 
savings/reduced investment on buying the new government bonds. There is no change 
in Ms or H. 
Row 5 considers a ‘pure’ financial crisis in which banks reduce their lending to the 
private non-financial sector. For both sectors the reduction in bank lending is balanced 
by a reduction in deposits. The result is that Ms falls (because D falls) while H is 
unchanged.  
Row 6 is for ‘pure’ quantitative easing: the CB goes into the market and buys 
government bonds from the private non-financial sector. By the time the CB’s cheque 
has passed through the payments system, this brings about an increase in both the 
deposits of the private non-financial sector and the reserves of the commercial banks. 
For the CB the rise in its assets (increased bond holdings) is balanced by the rise in its 
liabilities in the form of banks’ reserves, for the banks the rise in their assets (reserves) 
is balanced by a rise in their deposit liabilities, and for the private non-financial sector 
the fall in bond holdings is balanced by a rise in another asset, their bank deposits. The 
result is that M and H both rise. 
Row 7 combines a financial crisis/fall in bank lending (as in row 5) with a fiscal 
expansion (as in row 4) of the same magnitude. The private non-financial sector ends up 
with more bonds (to the extent of the fall in its financial deficit), less loans and less  
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Table 3.3: Effects on the flow of funds 
 Exogenous change proximate ramifications effect on 
Ms 
effect 
on H 
1 standard CB refinancing of banks: increase in CBL ∆CBL↑, ∆H↑, ∆R↑; banks get increased liability (CBL) but increased asset in form 
of additional reserves at CB (R) 
no 
change 
rise 
2 issuance of new equity and bond by banks, bought by 
private non-financial sector 
∆NDL↑, ∆D↓; private non-financial sector has less bank deposits but more bank 
paper, banks have less deposit but more non-deposit liabilities 
fall no 
change 
3 banks buy government bonds (to improve own liquidity) 
from private non-financial sector 
∆GDnf↓, ∆GDf↑, ∆D↑; banks have more government bonds but more deposit 
liabilities, private non-financial sector has less bonds but more deposits 
rise no 
change 
4 fiscal expansion (with equivalent fall in private sector 
financial deficit) financed by bond issue bought by private 
non-financial sector 
G-T↑, I-S↓, ∆GD↑, ∆GDnf↑; private non-financial sector buys newly issued bonds 
with its extra financial resources 
no 
change 
no 
change 
5 ‘pure’ financial crisis: banks reduce their lending ∆A↓, ∆D↓; equivalent reduction in bank lending and deposits affecting both 
financial and non-financial sectors (in opposite ways) 
fall no 
change 
6 ‘pure’ QE: CB purchases government bonds from private 
non-financial sector 
∆GDcb↑, ∆GDnf↓, ∆D↑, ∆R↑; rise in private non-financial sector’s deposits 
(balancing fall in its bonds), rise in banks’ reserves at CB (offsetting rise in their 
deposit liabilities) 
rise rise 
7 financial crisis plus fiscal expansion financed by bond 
issue bought by private non-financial sector 
G-T↑, I-S↓, ∆GD↑, ∆GDnf↑,∆A↓, ∆D↓; private non-financial sector has more 
bonds (to the amount of the fall in I-S), less loans and less deposits [sum of rows 4 
and 5] 
fall no 
change 
8 financial crisis plus QE: bank lending falls but CB buys 
more bonds to same extent 
∆A↓, ∆GDcb↑, ∆GDnf↓, ∆R↑; private non-financial sector has less loans but also 
less bonds and its deposits remain unchanged, banks have less loans but more 
reserves at CB [sum of rows 5 and 6] 
no 
change 
rise 
9 fiscal expansion plus QE: government issues new bonds 
which are then purchased by CB 
G-T↑, I-S↓, ∆GD↑, ∆GDcb↑, ∆D↑, ∆R↑; private non-financial sector has lower 
financial deficit and higher deposits, banks have rise in reserves [sum of rows 4 and 
6] 
rise rise 
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deposits. The result, which is the sum of the results for rows 4 and 5, is that M falls and 
H is unchanged. 
Row 8 combines the financial crisis with QE (as in row 6) of the same magnitude: here 
banks’ lending falls but the CB steps in to buy government bonds, and its purchase of 
bonds from the private non-financial sector offsets the impact of the fall in banks’ 
lending on the private non-financial sector’s bank deposits. For the banks there is a fall 
in one asset (loans) offset by a rise in another (reserves at the CB). The overall effect 
(the sum of those in rows 5 and 6) is that M is unchanged but H rises. 
Finally, row 9 combines fiscal expansion with QE of the same magnitude. Here the 
government issues bonds to cover its increased budget deficit, and these bonds are in 
effect bought by the private non-financial sector (the independent CB is not allowed to 
participate in the primary government debt market) but then sold immediately to the CB. 
Thus the private non-financial sector, which has a reduced financial deficit 
(corresponding to the increased government budget deficit) ends up with a rise in its 
deposits, while for the banks the increase in deposit liabilities is balanced by a rise in 
reserves at the CB. In total (combining the results of rows 4 and 6), M rises (because 
deposits rise) and H rises (because banks’ reserves rise). This is, in effect, the standard 
case of a monetary-financed fiscal expansion. 
The most important point to take from the present discussion is that QE raises the 
money supply, either absolutely (rows 6 and 9) or relative to what would have happened 
otherwise (row 8). On the other hand, banks’ issues of new equity tend to reduce money, 
while banks’ acquisitions of government debt tend to increase it. 
3.4. An Analysis of Broad Money and Its Influence 
3.4.1. Monetary growth in the UK 2007-10 
In this section I will try to highlight the large developments in financial flows since 
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2007.43 Figure 3.3 shows the trend decline in the velocity of broad money (measured as 
quarterly nominal GDP divided by M4ex), which was then reversed from 2009 Q2. The 
lines for nominal income and broad money growth (since four quarters before) make 
clear that the last part of the decline reflected a faster fall of nominal income than of 
broad money from mid-2008, while the reversal of the decline reflected the rebound of 
nominal income growth; broad money growth on this four quarter basis did not go 
negative, and began to rise again after 2010 Q1. 
Figure 3.3: Velocity, nominal income growth and broad money growth 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the four quarter growth rates of M4ex and M4ex lending. Between 
mid-2005 and end-2007 M4ex grew at around 10%, while M4ex lending growth was 
initially higher but started falling in mid-2007. The growth of both series fell sharply in 
2008 and 2009 to below 2%. Lending recovered slightly in late 2009/early 2010 and 
then declined further, while M4ex growth rose gently from 2010Q1. 
 
 
                                                             
43 The monetary data are from the Bank of England’s interactive statistical database, and other data 
from the Office of National Statistics and International Financial Statistics. 
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Figure 3.4: Four quarter changes in M4ex and counterparts (% of M4ex)
 
 
Figure 3.5: M4ex and counterparts, four quarter changes (£ mn) 
 
Figure 3.5 shows four quarter growth changes for M4ex, M4ex lending and the other 
counterparts. Net sterling lending to the public sector by monetary financial institutions 
(MFIs), where MFIs include the Bank of England so that this includes asset purchases 
(QE), is essentially the government’s deficit minus what it borrows from the private and 
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overseas sectors. This was close to zero up to mid-2009, when it rises very sharply, 
peaking in the first half of 2010 at a level comparable to that of M4ex lending in 2006-
08 and exceeding total monetary growth in that period. The change in MFIs’ externals (a 
heterogeneous category which includes central bank and commercial bank external and 
other foreign currency transactions) was low in the early years but then fluctuates 
widely in both directions in 2009-10. The change in banks’ net non-deposit liabilities (a 
negative contribution to monetary growth, officially referred to as the change in MFIs’ 
net sterling assets) was low in the early years but much larger and more erratic in 2009-
10. 
Figure 3.6: Financial surpluses/deficits by sector (% of GDP) 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the financial surpluses/deficits of different sectors. In the early years 
the foreign sector has a consistent surplus (i.e. there is a current account deficit) and that 
continues with little change over 2008, 2009 and 2010. On the other hand the general 
government’s deficit increases in 2008 and even more strongly in 2009, and falls 
slightly in 2010. The private sector has corresponding movements in its financial 
surplus; disaggregated data make clear that the main changes arise in the household 
sector, whose surplus increased very strongly in 2009, while non-financial and financial 
corporations experienced a rise and a fall respectively in 2010. 
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Finally, Figure 3.7 shows new issuance by private non-financial corporations (quarterly 
and over the four preceding quarters). The series fluctuates widely but it is clear that 
there were exceptional levels of issuance in 2009-10.  
Figure 3.7: Issuance by private non-financial corporations 
 
The main point that emerges from this discussion is that the fiscal expansion, the 
financial crisis (in terms of its impact on bank lending) and QE are all substantial and in 
some sense exogenous changes to the counterparts of broad money growth over 2008-
10. The fiscal expansion clearly originates outside the monetary sphere, in the 
combination of the financial crisis, the sharp cyclical downturn and the measures taken 
to mitigate the recession by the Labour government. The financial crisis, with the 
problems of bad debts, on the one hand, and the freezing of the interbank market, on the 
other, led to a very sharp fall in bank lending: the careful examination by Bell and 
Young (2010) of the balance between credit supply side factors and loan demand factors 
finds that credit supply effects were dominant.44 And QE itself was the result of a policy 
                                                             
44 More precisely they conclude that “the evidence discussed in this article suggests a significant role 
for a persistent tightening in the supply of credit, independent of changes in credit quality and Bank 
Rate… Credit demand is also likely to have weakened during the recession…” (Bell and Young, 
2010: 319). See also the study by Aiyar (2011) on the transmission of shocks to banks’ external 
funding through to their domestic UK lending.  
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decision taken by the MPC in the light of the crisis and the recession. Moreover, these 
changes are substantial enough not to be washed away in the short term through the 
usual adjustment mechanisms that allow monetary growth in more tranquil periods to be 
reasonably viewed as essentially endogenous. 
This suggests that it would be useful to investigate whether I can use money and credit 
directly (in a reduced form equation) to analyse the course of UK GDP over the crisis. 
This would link the monetary developments to GDP in a way that the popular work on 
the effect of QE on long-term interest rates is unable to do. If a clear relationship is 
found this might make it possible to get a better grip of what would have happened to 
income in the absence of the financial crisis, and then in the absence of QE, by 
simulating the effects of counterfactual levels of monetary growth. In such an exercise it 
will be crucial to identify the appropriate counterfactual levels of monetary growth, 
taking account of the various potential offsets highlighted by Bridges et al. (2011): 
issuance by banks (affecting NDLs); banks’ acquisitions of government debt (affecting 
MFIs’ net lending to the public sector); and issuance by PNFCs, which may affect the 
demand for bank lending. First, however, examine the relationship between nominal 
spending growth and broad money growth. 
3.4.2. The relationship between nominal spending growth and broad money growth 
In this part I am going to investigate whether it is possible to explain the four-quarter 
growth rate of nominal GDP (the growth since four quarters before) on the basis of the 
four quarter growth rate of nominal money and other variables. I use four quarter 
growth rates in order to concentrate on ‘medium term’ effects and to abstract from short 
run noise. 45  Given that there is no obvious up-to-date reduced-form (or structural) 
model that I can pluck off the shelf to analyze this relationship, I approach it as follows. 
First, I draw on the forward-looking Taylor rule literature in choosing as regressors the 
variables typically used to forecast inflation and the output gap in standard GMM 
                                                             
45 This also means that for the monetary data, where the seasonal adjustment procedures are still 
under discussion (Hussain and Maitland-Smith, 2010; Gilhooly and Hussain, 2010), I can reasonably 
use non-adjusted data. 
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estimations (see, for example, Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1998), together with the 
nominal money growth rate. Second, I use the automatic econometric model selection 
procedure within PC-Give (formerly known as PC-GETS) to select the variables and the 
lags. 
The measure of broad money is the Bank of England’s recently introduced preferred 
measure, M4 excluding intermediate OFCs. This measure is only available since 1997 
Q4, so I use the four-quarter growth rate of M4 as broad money growth before 1998 Q4. 
Figure 3.3 above shows the four quarter growth rates of nominal GDP and nominal 
money on this basis, together with the corresponding growth rate for real GDP. The 
independent variables are lagged nominal GDP growth, the annual growth rate of the 
world commodity price index, Bank Rate and nominal money growth. I consider up to 4 
lags of each variable.46  
Since, as set out in the previous section, there is a suspicion that money may have been 
subject to extraordinary supply-side shocks in the last few years which might have 
changed the underlying relationships, we estimate this equation with interacted dummy 
variables for M4 growth and Bank rate: the dummy is defined as zero up to 2007 Q2 
and 1 thereafter, and it is interacted with each of the four lags of these two variables. 
The results of the regression are reported in the first column of Table 3.4. For the period 
as a whole, the automatic selection programme in PC-Give selects only the lagged 
dependent variable (lagged one period), nominal money growth (lagged three periods) 
with a rather small but significant coefficient, and commodity price inflation (lagged 
three periods), but not Bank Rate. However, the interacted dummy variables covering 
only the period from 2007 Q3 turn out to be very important: money growth (lagged two 
periods) has a significant coefficient of 0.70, and Bank Rate (lagged four periods) has a 
significant coefficient of -1.49. This coefficient on monetary growth is less than the 1 
that might be expected from a simple quantity theory model (with constant velocity), 
                                                             
46 I also experimented with US and euro area output gaps, but this did not produce satisfactory 
results. 
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but given the medium rather than long-term focus of the analysis it is impressively large. 
The coefficient on lagged Bank Rate is also strikingly high: it implies that a rise of 1% 
in Bank Rate leads in four quarters to a 1.49% fall in the rate of nominal GDP growth. 
The lags – given that money growth is since four quarters before – are broadly 
consistent with a priori expectations and, in the case of Bank Rate, with the Bank of 
England’s BEQM model.  
The exercise is repeated in equation [2] for real GDP growth against real M4 growth. 
The latter is calculated using the GDP deflator, so the conversion is the same as for 
nominal GDP, but the other variables – commodity price inflation and Bank Rate – are 
unchanged between the regressions. The results are broadly the same. Here a second 
term in GDP growth (lagged four periods) is significant, and Bank Rate has a small but 
significant negative coefficient for the period as a whole. For the later period the 
interacted variables for money growth and Bank Rate both have smaller (than in [1]) but 
still highly significant coefficients. 
These results were obtained from a naïve reduced form single-equation regression, 
which does not consider directly, for example, variables representing world economic 
activity or domestic fiscal policy and in which the lagged dependent variable is very 
important. However, the fact that the same broad pattern of results – small roles for 
Bank rate and money growth in the 1994-2007 period, but negative and significant 
coefficients on Bank rate and positive and significant coefficients on money growth in  
the later period – is found even if real GDP growth is made dependent on nominal 
money growth,47 suggests that the finding is robust.  
Overall, these results are consistent with the proposition that money has a significant 
role in explaining nominal spending growth in the periods which include the crisis and 
QE, but little such role in the tranquil pre-crisis period; and they are consistent with 
                                                             
47 In this case there is a significant positive coefficient on Bank Rate for the overall period, but this is 
more than offset by significant negative values on the interacted dummy variables for Bank Rate 
(lagged two and four periods), and there is a significant positive coefficient on nominal money of 
0.56. 
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Goodhart’s (2007) argument that money may sometimes provide no additional useful 
information beyond that provided by inflation, output and interest rates, but in other 
periods money might tell us more, so that in general it should be monitored rather than 
ignored. In the next two sections I use the results of regression [1] to illustrate the 
magnitude of the impact monetary developments might have had on the economy, first 
for the downturn in bank lending in the crisis period of 2007-8 and then for the QE 
period of 2009-10. 
Table 3.4: PC-Give autometrics estimation 
Dependent variable: nominal GDP growth / real GDP growth 
Sample period: 1994 Q1 to 2010 Q4 
 [1]: nominal [2]: real 
   
Constant 2.29* 
(0.32) 
1.31** 
(0.13) 
GDP growth (-1) 0.51** 
(0.06) 
0.79** 
(0.05) 
GDP growth (-4)  -0.21** 
(0.03) 
M4 growth (-3) 0.07* 
(0.03) 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
Bank Rate    (-3)  -0.01** 
(0.004) 
commodity price inflation (-2)  -0.01** 
(0.003) 
commodity price inflation (-3) -0.01** 
(0.004) 
 
M4growth  (-2)*dum 0.70** 
(0.11) 
0.47** 
(0.06) 
Bank Rate (-4)*dum -1.49** 
(0.18) 
-0.74** 
(0.08) 
Adjusted R2 0.94 0.97 
   
AR 1-5 test:       F(5,57) 0.83090 [0.5331] 0.98108 [0.4373] 
ARCH 1-4 test:  F(4,60) 0.85417 [0.4967] 0.28612 [0.8859] 
Normality test:   Chi^2(2) 1.6718 [0.4335] 2.2232 [0.3290] 
Hetero test:        F(10,57) 2.5113 [0.0141]* 0.49697 [0.8850] 
Hetero-X test:    F(20,47) 1.5412 [0.1118] 0.57136 [0.9130] 
RESET23 test:   F(2,60) 1.5422 [0.2223] 1.6169 [0.2070] 
AR 1-5 test:       F(5,57) 0.83090 [0.5331] 0.98108 [0.4373] 
 
Notes: growth of GDP or money is growth since four quarters before; equation [1] has nominal GDP 
growth as the dependent variable and nominal M4ex growth among the independent variables, 
equation [2] has real GDP growth as the dependent variable and real M4 growth among the 
independent variables; standard errors are in brackets; ** significant at the 1% confidence level; * 
significant at the 5% confidence level. 
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3.4.3. The effect on nominal income of the collapse of bank lending 
I have already referred to the work of Bell and Young (2010), which found that there 
were significant supply-side factors in the downturn of bank lending to the private non-
financial sector during the crisis. On that basis I suggest that an appropriate 
counterfactual A for what would have happened if there had been no financial crisis is 
that (nominal) M4ex lending would have continued through 2008 to 2009 Q4 at a 
‘normal’ rate. Given that the evolution of M4ex over this period was dominated by and 
very close to that of M4ex lending (see Figure 3.3), I make this operational by simply 
assuming that the four quarter growth rate of M4ex does not fall below its average of 
6.48% in 1998-2004 (which omits the period of faster growth in 2005-7). Thus on 
counterfactual A M4ex growth in 2008 Q1 is at the historical rate of 8.3% and in the 
following seven quarters it is 6.48%, as against the historical values of 6.6, 4.3, 3.7, 4.4, 
3.1, 1.9, 1.0 and 0.8%. The actual and counterfactual paths for the four quarter growth 
rate of nominal money are shown in Figure 3.8. I then use the coefficient estimates from 
regression [1], the predicted values of the lagged growth rate, the counterfactual values 
for money growth and the actual values of commodity price inflation and Bank Rate, to 
calculate what the nominal GDP growth rate would have been under the counterfactual 
rate of money growth.  
Table 3.5 gives the definition of the counterfactual and Figure 3.9 shows the actual path 
of the growth rate, and that predicted under counterfactual A (with the actual values of 
the independent variables up to 2008 Q1). It suggests that nominal spending growth 
would have been much higher if bank lending had not collapsed in the way that it did 
during the financial crisis: growth falls to a low of only -1.8% in the first half of 2009, 
as opposed to the actual trough of -5.5%, and by the end of 2009 it is picking up 
strongly. The high rates of growth reached in 2010 also reflect the cuts in Bank Rate in 
2008 Q4 and 2009 Q1 (which might not have been needed if the financial crisis had not 
occurred). For this reason amongst others the counterfactual should be regarded as 
suggestive rather than a precise estimate. 
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Table 3.5: The counterfactuals  
 purpose of counterfactual implementation 
A to identify broad money growth in 
absence of financial crisis-induced cut 
in bank lending 
broad money growth does not fall below 
its average for 1998Q4 to 2004Q2, i.e. 
6.48% 
B to identify broad money growth in 
absence of quantitative easing 
broad money level set equal to actual 
minus cumulative asset purchases under 
APF 
C to identify broad money growth in 
absence of QE but taking account of 
offsets from (a) rise in non-deposit 
liabilities (=> Ms↓) and (b) banks’ 
purchases of public sector debt (=> 
Ms↑) 
broad money set equal to actual plus 
excess of change in MFIs’ net sterling 
assets (over average for 1997Q4-2007Q4) 
minus excess of MFIs’ lending to public 
sector (over average for 1997Q4-2007Q4)  
D to identify broad money growth in 
absence of QE but taking account of 
offsets from (a) rise in non-deposit 
liabilities (=> Ms↓), (b) banks’ 
purchases of public sector debt (=> 
Ms↑) and (c) increased issuance by 
PNFCs (=> bank lending↓ and Ms↓) 
broad money set as in counterfactual C 
plus excess of PNFCs’ issuance (over 
average for 2003Q1-2008Q4) 
 
Note: the offsets are calculated from 2009 Q1 to the end of 2010, except for that for the 
non-deposit liabilities which starts in 2009 Q2 (because there are very high and largely 
offsetting variations in that series for 2008 Q4 and 2009 Q1, and given that QE started 
only in March 2009 it is unlikely that significant QE-related issuance by banks occurred 
in 2009 Q1).  
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Figure 3.8: Money growth under counterfactual A 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Nominal GDP growth under counterfactual A 
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3.4.4. The effect on nominal income of QE 
I now turn to assess the impact of quantitative easing on nominal GDP growth, given 
the occurrence of the financial crisis, by constructing a counterfactual path for monetary 
growth. Given the complexity of the issue and the various offsets to QE which have 
been identified by Bridges et al. (2011), I construct three different counterfactuals (see 
also Table 3.5 above). First, if there were no offsets to QE at all, then M4ex in the 
absence of QE would have been lower by the cumulative amount of the asset purchases: 
in this counterfactual B money growth falls much faster than the historical series, 
turning negative in 2009 Q2, reaching -11.6% in 2009 Q3 but then returning towards the 
historical series as QE begins to fall out of the four quarter interval during 2010. 
Second, there is an important offset highlighted by Bridges et al. (2011): the effect of 
‘banking sector stabilisation’ in the form of (a) banks’ issuance of new equity and bonds 
which raises their non-deposit liabilities and reduces their deposits (see row 2 in Table 
3.3), and (b) banks’ acquisition of additional public sector debt in order to improve their 
liquidity ratios, which increases their deposits (see row 3 of Table 3.3). It is likely that 
some banking sector stabilisation of these kinds would have occurred in the absence of 
QE, since banks needed to improve their capital ratios after the revelation of large 
housing-related bad debts. But it could be argued that the stabilisation was facilitated by 
QE: QE meant that ‘other financial corporations’ (OFCs), notably pension funds and life 
assurance companies, which had sold their gilts to the BoE now had extra resources to 
invest, and this may have encouraged banks to issue new paper. I therefore construct a 
counterfactual C under which nominal money was lower by the amount of the ‘excess’ 
lending by MFIs to the public sector (which includes both QE and commercial banks’ 
purchases of gilts), net of the ‘excess’ increase in MFIs’ non-deposit liabilities, where 
the excess is the deviation from the respective averages for 1997 Q4 to 2007 Q4. 
Third, Bridges et al. (2011) have also raised the issue of private non-financial corporate 
issuance. Here the argument is that PNFCs may have been issuing more equity and 
bonds over the QE period because OFCs were willing to buy, as with bank issuance, but 
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this might reduce the PNFCs’ demand for credit and hence their borrowing from banks, 
in which case the stock of M4ex lending and M4ex itself would be lower by the 
(cumulative) amount of PNFC issuance. I therefore construct a final counterfactual D by 
adding to the nominal M4ex implied by counterfactual C the amount of PNFC issuance 
from 2009 Q2 in excess of the average issuance from 2003 Q1 to 2008 Q4 (the period 
for which the data are available on the Bank’s website).  
The paths of nominal money growth under these counterfactuals are shown in Figure 
3.10. Counterfactual B implies the largest effect from QE, counterfactual C a smaller 
effect and counterfactual D an even smaller effect. As stated above there is evidence that 
the fall in bank lending was more of a supply-side phenomenon. To the extent that the 
fall was supply-driven then additional PNFC issuance would be providing firms with 
additional resources without reducing the amount of firms’ borrowings from the banks, 
so the size of the offset would be smaller. It is also arguable that much of the banking 
sector stabilisation would have taken place, necessarily, even in the absence of QE. So 
while counterfactual D can be regarded as the lower bound (and it is close to the lower 
bound suggested by Bridges et al., 2011), it seems likely that the ‘true’ counterfactual 
would involve a somewhat larger fall in nominal money growth, somewhere between 
counterfactuals B and D. It should also be noted that there is a sharp jump in nominal 
money in 2010 Q1 under counterfactuals C and D. This is the result of an exceptionally 
large rise in banks’ non-deposit liabilities in that quarter, followed by a fall in 2010 Q2, 
and of the fact that the assumptions defining the counterfactuals are taken to hold 
beyond the end of QE (in January 2010). This means that for these two counterfactuals 
more weight should probably be attached to the results for 2009 than for the later 
quarters. 
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Figure 3.10: Money growth under counterfactuals B, C and D 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Nominal GDP growth under counterfactuals B, C and D 
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These counterfactuals are then used to find what the nominal GDP growth rate would 
have been in the absence of QE, as understood in each case. Figure 3.11 shows the 
actual path and those predicted under counterfactuals B, C and D. In each case the 
difference between the actual and the counterfactual paths of nominal GDP can be 
interpreted as a (rough and suggestive) estimate of the effect of QE under the relevant 
assumptions. On counterfactual B, that is if no QE was undertaken and there were no 
offsets to it, growth falls heavily to a trough of -13.8% in 2010 Q3, before turning up. 
On counterfactuals C and D, where there are assumed to be varying offsets, growth 
improves from 2009 Q3 but becomes positive only in 2010 Q3 and 2010 Q4 
respectively, whereas actual (and predicted) nominal spending growth rose above zero 
in 2010 Q1. The implication is that in the absence of QE nominal spending growth 
would have been considerably weaker for longer. In other words QE did indeed have a 
significant impact on nominal spending and hence economic activity in the UK. 
There are two papers I mentioned in section 3.2 which used structural VAR models to 
estimate the macro impact of QE. Bridges and Thomas (2012) has an estimate of the 
impact on the level of GDP of 2% and on CPI of 1%; Kapetanios et al (2012) estimated 
the impact on GDP at 1.5% and that on CPI at 1.25%. My ‘pure-QE-shock’ estimation 
for year 2010 under the SVAR of the impact on GDP is 2.5% and that on CPI is 0.4%. 
An article in the Bank’s Quarterly Bulletin (Joyce et al. 2011) has also reported a 
number of estimates of the peak effect of QE on real GDP and CPI inflation taken from 
ongoing research at the Bank: the range for GDP is 1.5-2%, and that for CPI inflation is 
0.75-1.5%. If I take the sum of these to be a reasonable estimate of the change in 
nominal GDP, this comes to around 2.25% to 3.5%. In Figure 3.11, the difference in the 
four quarter nominal GDP growth rates as of 2010 Q1 (the QE period) between the 
predicted rate and the rate on counterfactual D (which implies the smallest impact of QE) 
is also of the order of 3%, while the differences with counterfactuals C and B are around 
4.8% and 10.6%. On the other hand, my corresponding estimates of the peak effects are 
4.6% and 7.2% for the four quarters to 2010 Q2 on counterfactuals D and C, and 18.2% 
for 2010 Q3 on counterfactual B. Thus my estimates for the effect of QE are typically a 
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little higher than those reported by the Bank, particularly if the ‘true’ counterfactual is 
agreed to be somewhere between B and D, as argued above. 
How might QE influence the economy? The counterfactuals indicate how much the 
money might have influenced nominal spending and now I would like to explain how 
this may have occurred. Benford et al (2009) suggested several transmission channels 
for QE. Joyce et al. (2011) also list several possible transmission channels of QE. Those 
channels are the expectation channel, the asset market channel (includes portfolio 
rebalancing and signaling) and the bank lending channel. When financial companies 
hold more money because they have sold their gilts to the central bank, they would be 
expected to purchase other assets to rebalance their portfolios. This could push asset 
prices up and lower yields. The increased willingness to hold illiquid assets in the 
market would make investors more confident in selling their assets and thus further 
lower the yields. So in the asset market, the increase in total wealth and the decrease in 
borrowing cost together lead to higher nominal spending.  On the other hand, banks 
gain more money through QE and they would like to hold more illiquid assets in the 
form of loans. The private sector has easier access to loans, which encourages 
consumption and investment.  Even if banks do not lend more, they could also switch 
some liquid money to other assets, which would lower the interest rate. Finally, QE 
could make people believe that the interest rate would be kept at a low level and the 
inflation is really anchored to the inflation target, which should encourage both current 
spending and investment. Unlike the papers which study the yields on various assets 
and emphasize the portfolio rebalancing channel, my analysis on the effect of changes 
in money encompasses all those transmission channels. David Miles in his speech also 
supported the idea that the effect of money in QE covered all transmission channels. : 
"the effects are a bit like those from pumping water into a dry area: it is hard to know 
which channels the water will flow down, and much of it will seem to disappear, but 
that does not mean we are clueless on the nature of its impact…One can be unsure 
which are the most important channels, but most of them are helpful and it seems to me 
that none, in the current environment, are obviously harmful."   
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3.5. Conclusions 
Formal announcements of the introduction of quantitative easing emphasized the 
intended impact on money and credit and hence on nominal spending, but the main 
empirical research focuses on the effects of QE on long-term interest rates rather than 
money or credit. In this Chapter I have tried to see whether there is a direct connection 
between nominal spending growth and monetary growth, which I argue is very likely to 
have been significantly affected by the financial crisis and quantitative easing. The 
approach can be thought of as covering the range of possible transmission mechanisms, 
and connecting money with the object of ultimate interest, nominal spending, rather 
than say long-term interest rates. The results obtained should be treated as tentative, 
since they have been derived using a simple ad hoc reduced form equation rather than a 
more comprehensive model, and since it is only possible to give a range of 
counterfactuals on different assumptions. Nevertheless, they suggest strongly that 
changes in money have had a considerable impact on the economy in the last few years, 
and a much greater impact than in the pre-crisis period. This is consistent with the idea 
that in tranquil time money may not embody significant additional information, but that 
in other periods changes in banks’ behaviour may affect money, credit, nominal 
spending and the real economy. Moreover, they imply that QE has indeed had a major 
impact on the UK economy, and a somewhat larger impact on this analysis than that 
reported by the Bank of England. 
For this period at least broad money would indeed appear to tell us something, enough 
to suggest that more research would be appropriate. It may not be possible to gain 
further insights by working on simple reduced form models. Instead, these results are 
strong enough to suggest that operators of large macroeconometric models of the UK 
economy, notably the Bank of England, should experiment with the inclusion of 
monetary and credit variables in their models. The Bank’s (published) monitoring of 
money and credit could also be deepened.48  
                                                             
48 It is notable that ECB’s Monthly Bulletin, contains a more substantial analysis of money and credit 
than the BoE’s Inflation Report, while the BoE also has no parallel to the large-scale 
macroeconometric model of Giannone et al. (2009), which provides the basis for their (2011) 
estimates of the effect of the ECB’s non-standard policy measures. 
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Chapter 4. Inflation, Crisis and Money 
4.1. Introduction 
Since inflation targeting was introduced in the early 1990s, the Bank of England (BoE) 
had successfully kept inflation around a desirable level for nearly twenty years by 
adjusting Bank Rate. Studies on the monetary policy of the BOE in this period 
concerned the issues of the interest rate response to the economy. Especially since 
Taylor-Rule type reaction functions had been used as a good description of what the 
central bank had done, most recent research suggested that there was no big question in 
monetary policy which could not be addressed by changing the interest rate. To be more 
precise, the New-Keynesian Model which consists of three equations was considered 
good enough to explain the economy and other macro variables which were not 
included in this model were often ignored. However, since the financial crisis broke out, 
most central banks have decreased their interest rates close to the zero bound, and could 
not decrease them further. Under such a situation, when the interest rate is not flexible 
enough to react to the inflation and output problems in the economy, how far could we 
go if we still depend on the old theory without extra attention to other variables? 
The BoE adopted Quantitative Easing (QE) at the beginning of 2009 with the 
announcement of “the aim of boosting the supply of money and credit”.49 This suggests 
that it is the time to pay some attention to monetary aggregates. Though the aggregate 
money has been shown in the Inflation Report since it started twenty years ago, this 
does not prove that money had a strong role in the monetary policy of the BoE. 
Moreover, it seems that there was not a clear agreement even among the MPC members 
that money contains useful information when they made decisions. In Chapter 3, I focus 
on the impact of money growth on output and I found that the change in money did 
have an influence on nominal spending in the medium term. However, the BoE is a 
formal inflation targeting central bank, stabilizing inflation well is their first objective. 
                                                             
49 See the press statement of 5 March 2009, at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2009/019.html ,and the minutes of the MPC 
meeting at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/pdf/2009/mpc0903.pdf. 
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The attention to GDP growth is an important way to help targeting inflation in the short 
run but not the only way. Besides the indirect short term effect of money on inflation 
through nominal spending, it is worth investigating the link between money and 
inflation directly.  This chapter emphasizes the study of inflation decomposition and the 
link between money and inflation. As the link between money and inflation was hardly 
detected directly by some past research, several authors have recently suggested 
estimating inflation in a reduced-form “Phillips Curve” equation. 50 In this equation, 
money is used as an important component when looking at inflation from a long-run 
perspective. This is in accordance with the research on the Quantity Theory which was 
widely undertaken in the 1960s to study money and inflation. Besides quantity-theoretic 
variables, some real economic variables are included to show their link with inflation in 
the short run. The idea of explaining inflation from two perspectives in one equation 
makes it easy to see not only what variables should be linked with inflation but also at 
what frequency they show the links. This advantage prevents people from ignoring 
factors that work in other time horizons.  
Furthermore, as money is being given attention by policy makers now that 
unconventional policy has been adopted, the estimation in this paper is done on two 
periods. One is the estimation of ‘normal time’ which stops before 2008 and the other is 
until the end of 2010. The purpose of doing so is not to show that money works in crisis 
periods but not in tranquil periods. Instead, the comparison is to support the idea that 
money is always useful in looking at inflation and it has a certain link with inflation in 
the long run.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 is a literature review. The 
first part goes through the history of monetary theory. The second part focuses more on 
some recent research conclusions on different types of study of long-run relationships 
between inflation and other variables. Section 4.3 sets out the methodology. The 
technique used in this paper is based on frequency-domain technique, which is quite 
similar to the method of Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (henceforth AWG) 
                                                             
50 See Gerlach(2003) and Assenmacher-Wesche,K., and S.Gerlach (2006b). 
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(2006b)51. In section 4.4, after the estimation of the inflation equation, I do two further 
estimations which are at low frequencies and high frequencies respectively. All the 
estimations are done both for before the crisis and after the crisis. In order to show the 
relationship between money and inflation, output gap and inflation, I do a measure of 
causality. Section 4.5 is the conclusion. 
4.2. Literature Review 
4.2.1. The history of the study of money 
The study of money goes back over many centuries. In particular, the classical quantity 
theory, as proposed in the 18th century or even earlier, argued that there is a long-term 
relationship between price and money. At that time, the classical quantity theory did not 
raise the notions of “money demand” or “money supply”. Instead, the theory only gives 
a general equation to show the relation between money and inflation. The version of the 
quantity theory we usually study today is MV=PY where M is the quantity of money, V 
is the velocity, P is the price level and Y is the real output. The right hand side of the 
equation is nominal income in the economy while the left hand side is the money in 
circulation times the velocity. Later writers introduced other variables into this 
relationship, notably the interest rate. However, such developments modified and 
maintained, rather than eliminated, the long term relation between money and inflation. 
Fisher (1911) defined what is referred to as the classical quantity theory. In this version, 
money is identified as a means of transaction only and the equation is written as 
MV=PT where T is the volume of transactions. The explanation of this function is that 
M, V and T are taken as exogenous variables and thus the price level P is determined by 
M. The exogenous velocity V is assumed to depend on the ‘institutional arrangements’ 
in place in the time and country concerned, which are assumed not to vary much in the 
short run. Thus under the assumption of constant V and T, P must fluctuate with M, 
proportionally. 
                                                             
51 AWG is short for Assenmacher-Wesche,K., and S.Gerlach . The paper ‘AWG (2006b)’ refers to 
‘Understanding the link between money growth and inflation in the euro area’ . 
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The classical quantity theory was then developed by the Cambridge school, the main 
representative of which is Pigou. In contrast to the classical school, the Cambridge 
school brought the money demand question into the field of individual choice, making it 
more specific than the general description of classical theory. In the individual-level 
analysis, money is held for convenience and there is an opportunity cost to holding 
money. Though the Cambridge school did not explicitly consider the interest rate in 
their theory, they did mention other variables which could influence money holdings 
such as holding costs. Besides, they also put income Y rather than transaction volume T 
into the equation. Thus the overall national money demand was a function of national 
income.  
Though the Cambridge school had developed the quantity theory in which money is 
related to price, national income and holding costs, it still took money to be demanded 
for transaction purposes only. Keynes used the Cambridge approach to develop the 
quantity theory further. In Keynesian theory, money is held for transactions and 
precautionary motives, which indicate the role of national income in the equation, but 
also for the speculative motive. The speculative motive introduces the interest rate into 
money demand and treats it as a key reason for agents to hold bonds or money. 
Keynesian theory suggested that for every person, there was a range of interest rates 
which were considered as normal values. If the current interest rate level is above the 
“normal level”, the interest rate would be expected to fall. Since bond prices vary 
inversely with interest rates, the expectation of an interest rate fall encourages 
individuals to hold bonds instead of money. Conversely, a relatively ‘low’ interest rate 
would push some people to switch from bonds into money, and would therefore lead to 
a rise in money demand. So Keynesian theory suggests that the interest rate has a 
negative effect on money demand. And because the range of the ‘normal’ interest rate 
would vary across time it also suggests that the relation between the interest rate and 
money demand is unstable.  
Though Keynesian theory introduced the interest rate into monetary theory as the cost 
of holding money, the role of money was still that of means-of-exchange only. If money 
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is treated as a special kind of asset, the demand function would be more complicated. In 
Tobin’s (1958) model, money is taken as a riskless but zero-return asset. Risk-averse 
individuals with fixed wealth (a budget constraint) would balance the weights of it and 
those risky but interest rate earning assets (bonds, equity etc.) to reach their maximum 
utilities. The relationship between interest rate and money in this model, in contrast to 
what Keynesian theory suggested, however, is not negative all the time. When the 
interest rate rises, under the substitution effect bond holding increases and thus money 
demand decreases. However, the wealth effect of an interest rate change could either 
reinforce the substitution effect or go in the opposite direction. The combination of 
these two effects would lead to an increase, a decrease or no change in money holding. 
Thus in the Tobin model, we can only be sure that the interest rate could change money 
holdings but we cannot figure out the direction. 
Keynes’s theory of money, developed from the Cambridge approach, starts from the 
personal motives for holding money. The classical theory, on the other hand, focuses on 
the general theory of money. This is further emphasized by Friedman (1956) again and 
formed “modern quantity theory”. In Friedman’s theory, money demand is a function of 
wealth, interest rates, level of price and the rate of price change. What is particularly 
characteristic of money demand here is that, besides the price level, Friedman thought 
the price change could be taken as an own return of money which is not only related to 
nominal money, but to real money as well. When other variables are stable, the higher 
the rate of price change is, the less the money demand is. But for the price level, it is the 
reverse. The higher the price is, the more the money demand is. So in Friedman’s theory, 
the role of inflation is implicitly emphasized in the equation.   
To sum up the development of monetary theory by different schools, we could make a 
more sophisticated quantity theory of money which indicates that money is related to 
price, output and interest rate.52 The relation between money and output is positive; the 
price has a proportional relationship with money; and for the interest rate, it is more 
                                                             
52 For more studies on monetary theory, see Laidler, D.E.W (1985) The demand for money, theories 
evidence and problems. 
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widely accepted that the substitution effect of an interest rate change dominates the 
direction of money holding. Thus the interest rate has an inverse relationship with 
money. This chapter is concerned mostly with the relationship between money and 
inflation. 
4.2.2. Some empirical work on the relationship between money and inflation 
Though theories can explain the events in the economy by mimicking human motives 
and logical reasoning, empirical evidence is needed. Since the 1950s, many researchers 
have tried to empirically estimate those relationships. Lucas (1980) illustrated 
empirically two implications of QTM: one is that money growth rate would lead to an 
equal change in the rate of inflation; and the other is that money change induces an 
equal change in the interest rate. Lucas plotted the quarterly data of US during 1955—
1975. He found that the figures for the original CPI and M1 growth rate did not show a 
one-to-one relationship. Nor did the figures of interest rate and M1 growth rate. 
However, when he started to use moving-average data, the linear relationship began to 
show up. He found that when very low-frequency components were extracted from the 
data, the one-to-one relationship between inflation and money growth became clear, and 
similarly that between interest rate change and money growth. This result suggested that 
the proportional relation in inflation and money was a matter of “long-run average 
behaviour”. Besides Lucas, Vogel (1974) studied 16 Latin American countries between 
1950 and 1969 and he also showed a proportionate change in inflation after the change 
in money growth within two years. De Grauwe & Polan (2005) used data for 160 
countries over 30 years and tried to find out whether inflation and money have a 
proportional relationship. When they used the full sample to do cross-section estimation, 
they found that the result suggested a greater-than-one coefficient of money on inflation. 
However, as the authors divided the data into high-inflation episodes and low-inflation 
episodes, the linear relationship between inflation and money growth became weak in 
the low-inflation episodes. And the larger-than-one relationship still existed in high-
inflation episodes. The authors further checked this relationship by using panel data in 
their high-inflation group. They concluded from the evidence that due to velocity 
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change in high-inflation episodes, inflation could exceed the percentage increase in 
money growth and the time the transmission takes is approximately one year. Chrystal 
and Mizen (2011) revisited some work on money and its relations with other variables. 
The results of their regressions on inflation are quite similar when they used two 
definitions of money: retail M4 and M4ex (M4 excluding intermediate OFCs) in the UK.  
They found clear evidence of cointegration relationships between the quantity theoretic 
variables and in particular their estimation showed a long-run relationship between 
money and inflation. The coefficient of money was 1 while the coefficient of GDP was -
1, which was in line with the money demand equation. And their causality test showed 
two-way causation between money and inflation.  
There are some similar conclusions from the results of the papers. Most people agreed 
that there is a relationship between money and inflation in the long run, direct or 
indirect. And the interest rate also has a role in the equation of the quantity theory. 
However there are some disagreements as well. Some evidence shows a proportional 
relation between money and inflation while other evidence does not. I believe that when 
we use the data for different countries over different periods to do a relatively long-run 
estimation, we can hardly get the same result due to the specific characteristics of 
country technology or special time horizons. What’s more, the methods people have 
used to estimate a ‘long-run’ relationship have varied. As De Grauwe & Polan (2005) 
mentioned, some researchers have used cross-section data on some countries over a 
long time span; and some have used annual or quarterly data for one specific country 
over a long time span to estimate the relationships. For the first type, Nelson (2003) 
pointed out the flaws. He considered that the non-inflationary monetary growth rates 
were not identical across countries and thus using cross-section data would impose a 
common trend on velocity across countries. 
When one focuses on one-country analysis, he would use a long data series to estimate. 
There are three ways to define ‘long-run’ in regression. One is to include lagged values. 
Studies of this type have mostly constructed VAR or SVAR models to find evidence. 
Nelson (2010) suggested that “recovering the relation between money and inflation 
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involves looking at the relation between inflation and prior money growth”. According 
to his correlation tests, money growth leads inflation by one quarter. Including the 
lagged monetary values as explanatory variables helps explain the inflation on the left 
hand side.  
The second way to include past information on money is to use the average value of the 
variables. Lucas (1986) suggested using long moving averages to take out the long-run 
relation between money and inflation. His work (1980 and 1986) used this method to 
get a significant and close to one coefficient of money on inflation. Fitzgerald (1999) 
also estimated the relation between money and inflation on average values. He took 2-
year averages, 4-year averages, and 8-year averages of the annual growth rate of money 
and inflation from 1959 to 1999. He found the relationship became closer for longer 
time averages and the variation in money accounted for more of the variation in 
inflation.  
The third way of looking at the long-run relationship is to use a filter to get ‘core’ 
inflation and ‘core’ money growth. The idea of this methodology is to extract the long-
run component of the variables and then study the relation among them. Neumann 
(2003) investigated the role of money in explaining inflation of the Euro Area during 
1980 to 2002. He applied the HP filter to get the long-run components, which he 
preferred as a two-sided filter that is not solely depending on past information and is 
widely used for inflation expectations. The result of his paper suggested that the core 
inflation of the Euro Area during this period was driven by permanent money growth. 
The M3 growth rate was the dominant factor explaining the inflation of the Euro Area 
before and after EMU. Cogley (2002) proposed a new measure of the core components- 
the exponential filter. According to this paper, this filter would be an ideal filter if a 
suitable coefficient was chosen. And as a one-sided filter it can be implemented into real 
time, which is more useful to monetary policy makers, relative to the two-sided filter 
(See Cogley, 2002, p102). Gerlach (2004) used Cogley’s filter to investigate the relation 
between money and inflation for the Euro area. His results suggested that the long-run 
component of money was important during the 1970s and 1980s when inflation at that 
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time was high. There is another paper which uses four methods to study the money-
inflation relationship, which is Neumann and Greiber (2004). In this paper, the authors 
applied the HP filter, exponential filter, BK filter and wavelet analysis respectively to 
money in the Euro area and tried to corroborate the results. They suggested that there 
was a stable relation between the core components of money and inflation over four 
measures and the one-to-one relationship was also supported by the result.   
Besides the time-domain analysis, the inflation-money relationship has also been 
studied using frequency-domain techniques. Jaeger (2003) studied the two-pillars 
strategy of the ECB using spectral analysis. One of his findings is the co-movement of 
money and inflation at low frequencies. Bruggeman, Camba-Mendez, Fischer and 
Sousa (2005) developed structural filters based on spectral analysis. By applying 
double-sided and one-sided filters respectively, they found the correlation between 
money and inflation in the long run is strong while the output gap becomes significant 
in explaining inflation in the shorter term.  
Besides the papers above, the idea of this chapter comes more from the work done by 
Karin Assenmacher-Wesche and Stefan Gerlach (2006). In their paper “Understanding 
the link between money growth and inflation in the Euro Area” (AWG, 2006b), they 
used frequency-domain technology to assess the two pillars strategy of the ECB, 
offering evidence on “the determinants of inflation at different time horizons”. (See p.12) 
When the ECB reviewed its monetary strategy in 2003, some research pointed out in the 
Monthly Bulletin (2003 June, p.87) that “the inflation process can be broadly 
decomposed into two components, one associated with the interplay between demand 
and supply factors at high frequency, and the other connected to more drawn-out and 
persistent trends. The latter is empirically closely associated with the medium-term 
trend growth of money”. AWG (2006b) took variables in the quantity-theory, including 
money, as “persistent trends” and used the output gap as well as several cost-push 
variables as factors at high frequency. In their band spectral analysis, the authors took 
four years as the dividing line between high-frequency behavior and low-frequency 
behavior. They first ran the regression at low frequencies and the results showed that the 
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quantity-theoretic variables were significant while the output gap was not, as expected. 
But the unexpected thing was the significance of cost-push variables when they were 
included in the regression separately. Then the authors moved to regressions at high 
frequencies. The results they got showed the insignificance of quantity-theoretic 
variables but the significance of the output gap as well as the significance of the cost-
push variables when the high frequencies consist of the period between 0.5 to 4 years. If 
they tightened the high frequencies to 0.5-1.5 years, the cost-push variables remained 
significant and the output gap was not. Thus the authors ran regressions of inflation 
based on two-pillar Phillips Curve to do their analysis. The right-hand-side variables 
were decomposed into different frequencies, which were the low-frequency component 
of the quantity-theoretic variables, the high-frequency behavior of the output gap and 
the even higher-frequency part of cost-push variables. The evidence suggested that the 
quantity-theoretic variables, especially the money growth, were important in 
determining inflation at low frequencies while the output gap was much more important 
at high frequencies and the cost-push variables were significant at even higher 
frequencies. 
4. 3. Methodology 
As I have mentioned in the last section, the methodology I use to investigate the 
determination of inflation in this chapter involves frequency-domain techniques, the 
motivation for which comes from AWG (2006b). A time series like inflation, from the 
frequency-domain perspective, consists of different periodic components. As the ECB 
claimed in its Monthly Bulletin, “The inflation process can be broadly decomposed into 
two components, one associated with the interplay between demand and supply factors 
at high frequency, and the other connected to more drawn out and persistent 
trends.”(See ECB Monthly Bulletin, June 2003, p.87) Not only the inflation in the Euro 
Area, but other time-series can be decomposed into high frequencies and low 
frequencies. Low-frequency movements in series could be taken as long-run terms 
while high-frequencies reflect short-run variations. If we try to study the relations in 
those variables at a specific periodicity, it is natural to extract the corresponding 
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frequency components and then run spectral regressions on them.   
In AWG (2006a), the authors tried to explore “the hypothesis that the two pillars, the 
monetary and economic analysis, contain information useful for understanding inflation 
in the euro area at different time horizons using frequency domain methods.” (p.3) A 
reduced-form Phillips-Curve equation is estimated to “understand the inflation…at 
different time horizons”. Their procedure is firstly to take the Fourier Transform of the 
series associating different frequencies into the frequency domain. Then they extract the 
required frequency band and filter out the other frequencies. Thirdly they transform 
these ‘required frequencies’ in the frequency domain back to the corresponding 
components in the time domain. Finally the inflation equation is estimated by using 
those filtered series and the estimated coefficients are viewed as evidence of relations at 
certain frequency bands. Baxter and King (1999) viewed this band-pass filtering process 
is “a common approach”. (p.580) Hassler, J., P.Lundvik, et al. (1992) also used this 
frequency-domain method to study relations at different frequency bands.  
When AWG (2006b) tried to find out the long-term relationships between quantity-
theoretic variables, particularly the relation between money and inflation, they followed 
the band-spectrum regression in Engle (1974). Engle argued that one model may not fit 
all frequencies. “It may be useful to specify that a model applies for some but not all 
frequencies”. (See p.4) By applying a Fourier transform to the time-domain variables, 
they transformed the series into the frequency-domain, whose observations are in 
different frequencies, from low to high. In the transformed regression, Engle chose 
some frequencies and added the selected frequencies that are needed together to do the 
estimation. Finally, Engle proved that the estimator could be written as:  
?̂? = � 𝑓𝑥� (𝜃𝑘)�−1�𝑓𝑥𝑦� (𝜃𝑘) 
where Σ is defined as the sum over the included frequencies; 𝑓𝑥� (𝜃𝑘) is defined as the 
periodogram of x; 𝑓𝑥𝑦� (𝜃𝑘) is the cross periodogram between 𝑥 and y; T is the number of 
observations while k=0,1,…T-1. 
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In Engle’s method, the assumption of stationary, zero-mean variables is required. AWG 
(2006b) did unit root tests for all variables and found that all variables were stationary 
except inflation and money growth which were I(1). Thus they did a co-integration test 
between money and inflation. The results suggested that there was a co-integration 
relation between the two variables.  In order to use Engle’s method, the authors put a 
unit restriction on money growth and used the difference between inflation and money 
growth which is stationary as the dependent variable and put the other quantity-theoretic 
variables including the interest rate change and GDP growth rate on the right side of the 
equation. In other words, AWG (2006b) chose a method to ‘produce’ stationary 
variables as required for band spectral regression before transforming them into 
frequency-domain variables. 
As Engle’s estimator only works on stationary variables, an alternative way of 
estimating the relation between money and inflation is to use Phillips’s (1991) estimator 
which is suitable for I(1) variables which have cointegration relationships. This method 
is used and discussed in detail in AWG (2006a) 53. As there is no cointegration between 
money and inflation in the UK, Phillips’s estimator is not discussed in my work.  
In this paper, the estimates will not be precise if I follow the methods in AWG (2006b) 
completely because the characteristics of the data in UK are quite different from the 
data in the euro area. The biggest difference lies in whether inflation, quarterly money 
growth and output gap are stationary or not. Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 show the unit-root 
tests on the series for periods from 1975 to 2007 and from 1975 to 2010 respectively. In 
both tables, with 95% significance we can reject the null hypothesis of inflation having 
a unit root after including an intercept and a trend under both the ADF test and the PP 
test. The same is true for money growth. This suggests that money growth and inflation 
have only deterministic trends but not stochastic trends under both tests. For the output 
gap, however, it is also hard to judge whether it is I(1) or not. For the output gap 
between 1975 and 2007, two tests indicate it is a stationary variable while for this series 
                                                             
53 This paper is ‘Interpreting euro area inflation at high and low frequencies’ . The details of the 
Phillips estimator cab be found in Phillips (1991) and it will not be applied in this paper for the 
reasons discussed later. 
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over 1975 to 2010, two tests suggest it is I(1). Other variables are stationary without 
trend and their means are insignificantly different from zero.  
Estimating the Phillips-Curve equation in AWG (2006b) is the first and the main task I 
am going to do in my work, which will suggest the determination of inflation in the long 
term and short term. Before I start the “common approach”, Baxter and King (1999) 
suggested that predetrending the series in the time domain before taking the Fourier 
Transform is necessary, as stationary variables are required. (See p.580) In the UK data, 
there are deterministic trends in inflation and money growth, and a stochastic trend in 
the output gap. However, directly removing those trends in the time domain before 
using the Fourier Transform may distort the estimation that follows, as suggested by 
Corbae and Ouliaris (2002).   
Table 4.1: Unit-Root Test (1975 to 2007) 
Variables ADF test PP test  KPSS test (null: stationary) 
Inflation(incl. trend) -3.28* -9.45*** 0.20** 
Money growth  
(incl. trend) 
-7.02*** -7.34*** 0.12* 
GDP growth -4.03*** -11.69*** 0.17 
Interest rate change -10.04*** -10.03*** 0.05 
Output gap -3.08** -2.50 0.05 
Exchange rate change -9.78*** -9.69*** 0.06 
Import price change -6.96*** -6.88*** 0.93*** 
Table 4.2: Unit-Root tests (1975 to 2010) 
Variables ADF test PP test  KPSS test(null: stationary) 
Inflation(incl. trend) -3.67** -9.53*** 0.23*** 
Money growth  
(incl. trend) 
-7.23*** -7.54*** 0.09 
GDP growth -5.40*** -9.97*** 0.11 
Interest rate change -10.32*** -10.31*** 0.08 
Output gap -0.47 -0.10 0.30 
Exchange rate change -9.91*** -9.91*** 0.05 
Import price change -7.33*** -7.25*** 0.72** 
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In Corbae and Ouliaris (2002), the authors showed how biased and inconsistent 
estimates are introduced when we simply remove the deterministic trend and stochastic 
trend at the very beginning. When both dependent y and independent variables 𝑥 
contain deterministic trends, they would be written as: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡𝜋1 + 𝑦𝑡�  
𝑥𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡𝜋2 + 𝑥𝑡� ,                     (4.1) 
Where 𝑧𝑡=(1,t,…t
p) is the deterministic trend, 𝑦𝑡�  and 𝑥𝑡�  are stationary/non-stationary 
data with zero mean.  
Let 𝑋� = [𝑥1�,𝑥2� , … 𝑥𝑛�]′  be the matrix of observations of the regressor 𝑥𝑡� ,  𝑦� =[𝑦1�, 𝑦2� , … 𝑦𝑛�]. Detrending the data at the beginning can be expressed as 𝑄𝑧𝑋 and 𝑄𝑧𝑦. 
Let the Fourier Transform matrix W= ( 𝑤0,𝑤1,𝑤2, …𝑤𝑇−1)′  where 
𝑤𝑘 = �1, 𝑒𝑖𝜃𝑘 , 𝑒2𝑖𝜃𝑘 , … , 𝑒(𝑇−1)𝑖𝜃𝑘�  and 𝜃𝑘 = 2𝜋𝑘/𝑇 . W* is the complex conjugate 
transpose of W. Define A as the selector matrix that only keeps the relative frequency 
band BA and thus AC represents the residual frequencies over BCA. Thus AC *A=0 and 
AW extracts frequency band BA. Let ψ=W*AW and ψC= W* AC W. 𝛽𝐴 and 𝛽𝐴𝐴  are 
coefficients over BA and that over the left band BCA respectively. (See Corbae and 
Ouliaris, 2002, pp.1075-76)  
If we removed the trends at the beginning, 𝑦� is generated by the system 
𝐴𝐴𝑦� = 𝐴𝐴𝑋�𝛽𝐴 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴,                        (4.2) 
AC𝐴𝑦� = AC𝐴𝑋�𝛽𝐴𝐴 + AC𝐴𝐴,                 (4.3) 
Adding (4.2) and (4.3), and multiplying by W* gives 
𝑦� =ψ𝑋�𝛽𝐴 +ψC𝑋�𝛽𝐴𝐴 + 𝐴,                    (4.4) 
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Put (4.4) into (4.1),  
𝑦 = 𝑧(𝜋1 − 𝜋2𝛽𝐴) + 𝑋𝛽𝐴 +ψCz𝜋2(𝛽𝐴 − 𝛽𝐴𝐴) −ψCX(𝛽𝐴 − 𝛽𝐴𝐴) +  𝐴  (4.5) 
In equation (4.5), regressor x is band dependent coefficient 𝛽𝐴 and 𝛽𝐴𝐴 . So is the trend z. 
So Corbae and Ouliaris (2002) argued that trend removal is not simply putting 𝑄𝑧 on the 
series as the trend is also band-variant. They further illustrate how the estimator of the 
coefficient could be biased. The estimator for the required band BA has the form: 
𝛽𝐴� = 𝛽𝐴 − �𝑋′𝑄𝑧ψ𝑄𝑧𝑋�−1�𝑋′𝑄𝑧ψ𝑄𝑧𝑦�   (4.6) 
Using (4.5) and (4.6), the estimator will be 
𝛽𝐴� = 𝛽𝐴 − �𝑋� ′𝑄𝑧ψ𝑄𝑧𝑋��−1 �𝑋� ′𝑄𝑧𝜑𝑄𝑧[ψC𝑋�(𝛽𝐴 − 𝛽𝐴𝐴) − 𝐴]�  (4.7) 
And the expected value can be shown to be: 
E(𝛽𝐴�|𝑋) = 𝛽𝐴 − �𝑋′𝑄𝑧ψ𝑄𝑧𝑋�−1 �𝑋′𝑄𝑧𝜑𝑄𝑧ψC𝑋�(𝛽𝐴 − 𝛽𝐴𝐴)�   (4.8) 
From (4.8), we can tell that the estimates of the coefficient is biased when 𝛽𝐴 ≠ 𝛽𝐴𝐴 if 
the trend is conventionally removed. However, the authors also said that this bias would 
disappear as n goes to infinity if 𝑋� and 𝑦� are stationary.  
To overcome the drawback of conventional trend removal, Corbae and Ouliaris (2002) 
suggested taking the Fourier Transform of the series including the trend and then 
removing the undesired frequency band. So it is not the total trend that is deleted but the 
trend at BCA which is removed. In the frequency domain, this procedure can be 
explained as detrending in the performance of the regression, which is: 
𝛽𝐴�
𝑓 = 𝛽𝐴 + {𝑋′𝐴∗𝐴𝑄𝑎𝑎𝑧𝐴𝐴𝑋}−1{𝑋′𝐴∗𝐴𝑄𝑎𝑎𝑧𝐴𝐴𝐴}         (4.9) 
Clearly the estimator is unbiased. (Corbae and Ouliaris, 2002, pp.1080)  
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For I(1) variables which contain a stochastic trend, Corbae and Ouliaris (2002) showed 
that their Fourier transforms are frequency-wise dependent and the leakage exists even 
if the sample size goes to unlimited. Their LEMMA B in that paper shows this problem: 
𝑤𝑥�(𝜃𝑘) = 11−𝑒𝑖𝜃𝑘 𝑤𝑣(𝜃𝑘)− 𝑒𝑖𝜃𝑘1−𝑒𝑖𝜃𝑘 ∗ (𝑥𝑛� −𝑥0�)√𝑛   (4.10) 
where 𝑥� now is an I(1) variable and v is its first difference which is stationary. 𝑤𝑥�(𝜃𝑘) 
represents the Fourier transform of 𝑥� at frequency 𝜃𝑘 .  
LEMMA C in Corbae and Ouliaris (2002) shows this leakage is strong and will not 
disappear even though the data have been first detrended in the time domain. However, 
another paper by the authors gives a frequency domain filter (FD filter) to handle this 
problem. In Corbae and Ouliaris (2006), the FD filter works by suggesting a frequency 
domain fix. The authors wrote the second term of (4.10) as  
𝑤(𝑡
𝑛
)(𝜃𝑘) = −1√𝑛 ( 𝑒𝑖𝜃𝑘1−𝑒𝑖𝜃𝑘)             (4.11) 
Combining (4.10) and (4.11), the Fourier transform of non-stationary variable can be 
written as: 
𝑤𝑥�(𝜃𝑘) = 11−𝑒𝑖𝜃𝑘 𝑤𝑣(𝜃𝑘) + 𝑤(𝑡𝑛)(𝜃𝑘) ∗ (𝑥𝑛� − 𝑥0�)   (4.12) 
As the second term in (4.12) shows a clear trend in the frequency domain with a 
coefficient (𝑥𝑛� − 𝑥0�), the FD filter removes this trend in the frequency domain and thus 
removes the leakage from the low frequency. By using the residuals from the regression 
(4.12), it leaves an unbiased estimate of the first term. Then applying 𝛽(𝜃𝑘) to 𝑤𝑥�(𝜃𝑘) 
will leave an unbiased estimate of the filtered data. (Corbae and Ouliaris 2006, p.6) 
The FD filter uses frequency-domain techniques to extract variations at different 
frequencies from the time series. The biggest contribution of the FD filter is to extract 
specific components that do not require any pre-filtering in the time domain. It works 
well on both trend-stationary data and I(1) data. Though Corbae and Ouliaris (2006) 
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showed the better performance of FD filter in extracting cyclical components by 
comparing it with other filters like the HP filter and BK filter, the purpose of my work is 
not to select a ‘best’ filter to deal with my data. The reason I use the FD filter as the 
preferred method to do estimation is because of the limits in the methods of AWG 
(2006b) and the characteristics of the data in UK, as I have described above. In the 
estimation section, I firstly estimate the reduced-form inflation equation which can give 
indications on inflation determination. Then I do low-frequency regression and high-
frequency regression respectively. In all three types of regressions, the FD filter is used 
to extract the components at the required frequency band. In order to compare and 
support my conclusions, the “common approach” in AWG (2006b) to the inflation 
equation is used as well. To overcome the drawbacks mentioned, I transform inflation 
and money into the frequency domain first and then take the corresponding trends. For 
the non-stationary output gap, I take first-differences at the beginning though this is not 
a good way to avoid leakages completely. When focusing on the long-run relationships 
among quantity-theoretic variables, Engle’s (1974) method is applied too as the 
difference between inflation and money is stationary in the UK data.  Engle’s band 
spectral regression, as AWG describe in their work, could be taken as equivalent to 
filtering the variables and regressing the components at certain frequencies. In the 
Fourier transform and periodogram estimation process, the components of certain 
frequencies are calculated by summing up all the information of those frequencies in 
every observation. Thus the result is expected to be similar to that under the FD filter.  
The dividing line between low-frequency and high frequency is 4 years as that in AWG 
(2006b).The estimation period is from 1975Q3 to 2010Q4. As the definition for broad 
money is a little different during this period, M4ex, M4 and M3 are used to calculate 
money growth rates over 1998 to 2010, 1980 to 1998 and 1975 to 1980 respectively. 
The inflation is the seasonally adjusted CPI growth rate, the interest rate is the bank rate. 
The supply side shock variables are the import price and effective exchange rate. The 
output gap is calculated by detrending the GDP from 1975 to 2007 and it is little 
different from that calculated by using the HP filter. As the GDP has dropped sharply 
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since 2008, the value of GDP from 2008 to 2010 is not included in calculating the trend. 
Instead, I extended the previous trend to get the output gap. 
4.4. Estimation 
This section will show the result of regressions and discuss what relate to the inflation at 
low frequencies and high frequencies. By comparing the results in two periods, one of 
which is before the crisis and the other of which includes the data for the last three years, 
it is expected to find out the difference, especially in the role of money in it. 
4.4.1. Inflation and money at different frequency 
Before the estimations of inflation regression, let us look at the quarterly change of 
inflation and money in UK and their spectral density in the frequency domain. Figure 
4.1 and Figure 4.2 show the data in both time domain and frequency domain. The 
quarterly change of inflation used to be high and volatile before the mid-80s. But after 
that, it remained around 1 percent for twenty years until the crisis in 2008 when it 
became negative. The quarterly money growth was also higher during the period when 
inflation was high. Though the fluctuation in money growth recently is not as strong as 
it was in the 1970s, it is still clear that it has reached a lower level than before since 
2008. The latter two graphs describe the periodograms of the variables. The horizontal 
axis is the frequency of the series and the vertical axis describes its amplitude. For both 
inflation and money growth, the spectral densities show their peaks at low frequency 
range around zero and decrease sharply towards high frequency. Figure 4.2 shows that 
after 0.1π which corresponds to 5 years, the spectral densities keep low. For inflation, 
there is a small hump around 0.5π though it is much smaller than that at low frequency. 
This indicates that when inflation is decomposed into different frequencies, most 
variants and information are contained in the low-frequency component. The 
fluctuations in inflation are mostly long-run while some are of cycles around 1 year. 
And the periodograms suggest that the dividing line for long-run and short-run given by 
AWG (2006b) could also be used in this paper. 
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The first regression to run is the reduced form Phillips-Curve equation shown in the 
AWG (2006b) paper, in which the dependent variable is the inflation of all frequencies 
and the explanatory variables on the right-hand-side are those of different frequencies. 
As discussed at the beginning, I expected a long-run relationship between money and 
inflation, as well as the relation with other quantity-theoretic variables. Thus money, 
GDP growth and the interest rate are expected to explain the long-run term of inflation. 
Following AWG (2006b), all those variables are extracted from the frequency 
components longer than 4 years. The equation to show this low-frequency  
Figure 4.1: Inflation and money in time domain 
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Figure 4.2: Inflation and money in frequency domain 
 
 
relationship is: 
πlf = βmmt4−∞ + βρρt4−∞ + βrrt4−∞ + ϵtlf          (4.13) 
On the other hand, the output gap together with cost-push variables is expected to have 
a high-frequency influence on inflation. The output gap is extracted of the frequency 
from 1.5 years to 4 years. The cost-push variables are of 0.5 year to 1.5 year frequency 
which indicates the quickest influence. The high-frequency component of the inflation 
is expressed as: 
periodogram of inflation
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πhf = βggt−11.5−4 + βcct0.5−1.5 + ϵthf             (4.14) 
So the regression I am going to estimate is given as: 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝛽0 + �𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑡4−∞ + 𝛽𝜌𝜌𝑡4−∞ + 𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑡4−∞� + 𝛽𝑔𝑔𝑡−11.5−4 + 𝛽𝐴𝑐𝑡0.5−1.5 + 𝐴𝑡 (4.15) 
𝜋𝑡 is inflation of all frequencies, 𝑚𝑡 is the money growth rate, 𝜌𝑡 is the GDP growth 
rate, 𝑔𝑡−1 is the lagged output gap, and 𝑐𝑡  is the cost-push variable; Figure 4.3 and 
Figure 4.4 print the frequency components of inflation, money growth and output gap 
by using FD filter. The series at low frequency are shown in lines while the series at 
high frequency are shown in dots. Figure 4.3(a) describes the inflation rate and money 
growth (mgr in the figure) at low frequency. For the whole period, the long-run 
components of these two series moved in the same direction nearly all the time, which 
is not clearly shown on the original data.  And the money growth was more volatile than 
inflation all the time. At the beginning of the 1990s when inflation and money growth 
decreased a lot, money growth fluctuated more. It is the same during the crisis time 
when QE injected broad money in the economy. However, this head-to-head relation is 
not clear on the Figure 4.3(b) which describes the short-run components of the two 
series. The dots are clustered together and it is hard to find a linear relationship. Figure 
4.4(a) and Figure 4.4(b) describe the relation between the output gap and inflation. The 
long-term fluctuations of the output gap are more volatile than those of inflation which 
makes the relation ambiguous. However the dots are more likely to form a positive 
relationship.  
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Figure 4.3(a): Money and inflation at low frequency  
  
 
 
Figure 4.3(b): Money and inflation at high frequency 
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Figure 4.4(a): Output gap and inflation at low frequency 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4(b) Output gap and inflation at high frequency 
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4.4.2. The Phillips Curve Equation estimation 
The first estimations of equation 4.15 use UK data from 1975Q3 to 2007Q4 and the 
results are in Table 4.3. The first column shows the result for a regression in which all 
variables are at all frequencies. We have a coefficient of 0.164 on the money growth rate 
which is significantly different from zero at the 95% significance level. This value is 
much smaller than that found in AWG (2006b) for the euro area though both results are 
significant. The coefficient on the GDP growth rate is -0.309 and is also significantly 
different from zero at the 95% significance level. The coefficient on the interest rate 
change is very small and is insignificant. The output gap has a coefficient of 0.07 which 
is much smaller than other coefficients in the regression while the coefficients on the 
two cost-push variables are significantly different from zero at the 99% level and 
relatively large.  
The 2nd, 3rd and 4th columns show the results when the explanatory variables are taken at 
certain frequencies. The only difference in these three groups of results is the cost-push 
variable used. The estimates of coefficients on quantity-theoretic variables in these three 
columns are very similar. The money growth rate has a coefficient of 0.46 which is 
much higher than the estimate in the all-frequency regression. And it is different from 
zero at the 99% significance level. The coefficient on the GDP growth rate is still 
negative and its value is double that in the first column. The coefficient on the interest 
rate change is still insignificant though the value is much higher. The output gap at the 
1.5 years to 4 years frequencies has a coefficient of 0.45 which is significant at the 95% 
level. It takes more weight in the regression. The cost-push variable, however, is not 
significant in any regression.  
From the results in Table 4.3, it is clear that money growth increases its power of 
explaining inflation in the long run. When right-hand-side variables are at all 
frequencies, the movements in cost-push variables have more influence on inflation than 
the quantity-theoretic variables. Though money has a significant coefficient in the first 
column, the value of that coefficient is relatively small. When it comes to low-frequency 
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estimation, money plays a more important role in explaining inflation. The coefficient 
on money is nearly three times higher than before. The same is true for the GDP growth 
rate and interest rate change. The coefficient on the GDP growth rate is also much larger 
in the low-frequency regression. So is that on the interest rate change although the 
coefficient is still insignificant. However, this does not exclude the possibility that the 
quantity-theoretic variables, as expected, show long-run relations with inflation which 
might not be that obvious at all frequencies. The shrinking and insignificant coefficients 
on the cost-push variables indicate that the high-frequency movements are not as 
important as low-frequency movements in explaining inflation before the crisis.  
Table 4.3: Dependent variable: inflation at all frequencies, (1975-2007,U.K.) 
RHS variables All frequencies Above 4 years Above 4 years Above 4 years 
Money growth 0.164** 0.459*** 0.459*** 0.459*** 
GDP growth -0.309** -0.662*** -0.662*** -0.662*** 
Rate change 0.005 0.295 0.295 0.295 
  1.5to4ys 
Output gap 
(lagged 1 quarter) 
0.074* 0.452** 0.453** 0.454** 
  0.5to1.5ys 
Exchange rate change 0.117*** 0.058 0.051  
Imp ort price change 0.248*** 0.027  -0.016 
***: significant at 99% significance level; 
**: significant at 95% significance level; 
*:  significant at 99% significance level; 
  
When the data during the crisis period is included in the regression, the result does not 
show much difference for the quantity-theoretic variables. Table 4.4 shows the results. 
The coefficients on money growth, GDP growth and the interest rate change are nearly 
unchanged and the significance levels are also the same. This suggests that if the crisis 
period (it is only 3 years’ of data in this paper) is included, the role of money growth is 
unaffected. On the other hand the output gap becomes significant at the 99% level while 
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it was not significant in Table 4.3. The cost-push variables, however, show a different 
situation in the crisis period. The coefficient on the high-frequency exchange rate 
change becomes significantly different from 0 at the 95% significance level. It indicates 
that the influence of high-frequency movements from the supply side on inflation 
should not be ignored when the crisis is taken into consideration. 
Table 4.4: Dependent variable: inflation at all frequencies, (1975-2010,U.K.) 
RHS variables All frequencies Above 4years Above 4years Above 4years 
Money growth 0.160** 0.458*** 0.458*** 0.457*** 
GDP growth -0.214** -0.639*** -0.639*** -0.639*** 
Rate change 0.057 0.225 0.224 0.223 
  1.5to4ys 
Output gap 
(lagged 1 quarter) 
0.047* 0.342*** 0.343*** 0.343*** 
  0.5to1.5ys 
Exchange rate change 0.151*** 0.079** 0.067**  
Imp ort price change 0.258*** 0.047  -0.012 
***: significant at 99% significance level; 
**: significant at 95% significance level; 
*:  significant at 99% significance level; 
 
What is more interesting, the results in Tables 4.3 and Table 4.4 are very similar to what 
AWG (2006b) got for the euro area. In their results all the quantity-theoretic variables at 
low frequency have coefficients significantly different from zero, as well as the output 
gap at 1.5 years to 4 years frequency. The values of the coefficients on the low-
frequency variables, in the Euro Area, are higher than what I got for U.K. For the cost-
push variables, it is the oil price and import price rather than the exchange rate whose 
high-frequency movements can be used to explain the inflation in the Euro Area. And 
the values of the coefficients on the cost-push variables are also smaller than those on 
the quantity-theoretic variables, which is similar to the findings in this paper. 
As the idea of using the frequency-domain technique is from AWG (2006b), it would be 
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more interesting to estimate the same equations by their method described in section 3 
and to see whether it supports the suggestions in the tables above. The main difference 
between AWG’s method and the FD filter is whether it is necessary to pre-filter the data 
in time domain when there is a non-stationary series.  AWG’s method requires the data 
to be stationary or cointegrated. For the data from 1975 to 2007, the Unit-root test in 
Table 4.1 shows that the series of inflation and money growth are trend-stationary and 
the output gap is stationary. And the difference between inflation and money growth is 
also stationary. However, the output gap becomes I(1) if the data after 2008 is included. 
In this case, the estimation of the period between 1975 and 2007 would contain as much 
information as the estimation under FD filter while it requires to firstly difference the 
output gap for the period between 1975 and 2010. This difference could make the output 
gap stationary as the method required. The results are shown in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Estimations using conventional method in AWG 
RHS variables Above 4 years（until 
2007） 
Above 4 years (until 2010) 
Money growth 0.388*** 0.488*** 
GDP growth -1.214*** -0.859*** 
Rate change 0.430 0.431 
 1.5to4ys 1.5to4ys 
Output gap 
(lagged 1 quarter) 
0.604* 0.692** 
 0.5to1.5ys 0.5to1.5ys 
Exchange rate change 0.063** 0.082*** 
Imp ort price change 0.034 0.047 
***: significant at 99% significance level; 
**: significant at 95% significance level; 
*:  significant at 99% significance level; 
 
By comparing the results in table 4.3 and in the second column of Table 4.5, we can 
clearly tell that money growth at low frequency and the GDP growth rate at low 
frequency are still significant at the 99% significance level under AWG’s method for the 
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period between 1975 and 2007. The coefficient of money growth is nearly 0.4 which is 
a bit smaller than the value of 0.46 under the FD filter method. The coefficient of GDP 
growth is -1.214 whose absolute value is much larger than that in table 4.3. The interest 
rate is still insignificant. The output gap is significant at the 90% level and the 
coefficient is 0.604 which is quite similar to but larger than that in table 4.3. The 
coefficient of the high-frequency component of the exchange rate change is significant 
and the value is quite close to that in Table 4.3 while the other short-term variable 
import price change is still insignificant.  
The third column of the table shows the estimation for the period including the crisis 
period. The coefficient of long-term money growth is still significant at the 99% level 
and it is larger by 0.1 here. The coefficient of the output gap is also larger and is 
significant at the 95% level. The difference between this result and the result in the 
second column is quite similar to the difference between the two estimations under the 
FD filter method. The long-term money growth has a greater influence on inflation 
when the crisis period data are included in the estimation. And the output gap shows its 
impact on inflation especially in the crisis period. The supply side shocks have some 
influence on inflation but the coefficient is relatively small. The estimation indicates 
that when the crisis period is considered, the low frequencies of money growth and the 
high frequencies of the output gap have stronger influence in the determination of 
inflation.  
Though the values of the coefficients are not the same under these two methods, they 
are already quite close particularly for the coefficients of long-run money and short-run 
output gap. What we can tell from the frequency-domain estimation, no matter which 
method is used, is that money growth appears to have some influence on inflation in the 
long run according to the estimation. So does the short-term component of the output 
gap.  
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4.4.3. Estimations at low and high frequency respectively 
To further study how money and other variables determine the inflation, I am going to 
do low-frequency estimation and high-frequency estimation. When studying the 
determination of inflation in long-run, I put a unit restriction on money and use the 
difference between inflation and money as the dependent variable, and the frequency 
band is from 4 years to infinity for all variables. This is equivalent to estimating the 
equation: 
(𝜋𝑡 − 𝑚𝑡)4−∞ = 𝛽0 + �𝛽𝜌𝜌𝑡4−∞ + 𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑡4−∞� + 𝛽𝑔𝑔𝑡−14−∞ + 𝛽𝐴𝑐𝑡4−∞ + 𝐴𝑡 (4.16) 
The results are shown in Table 4.6.  
Table 4.6 : Regression at Low-frequencies, Dependent variable: 𝝅𝒕 −𝒎𝒕 
RHS variables 1975-2007 1975-2010 
constant -0.08 -0.11 -0.07 -0.10 
GDP growth -0.98*** -1.27*** -1.06*** -0.91*** 
Rate change -0.07 0.32 -0.27 0.05 
Output gap 
(lagged 1 quarter) 
 -0.01  -0.10*** 
Exchange rate change  -0.22**  0.04 
Import price change  0.06  0.02 R2��� 0.17 0.21 0.30 0.36 
***: significant at 99% significance level; 
**: significant at 95% significance level; 
*:  significant at 99% significance level; 
 
The first and third columns show the regressions which contain only quantity-theoretic 
variables as explanatory variables. The coefficient on the GDP growth rate is the only 
one which is significantly different from zero. Its values, -0.98 before and -1.06 after the 
crisis, are much higher than other coefficients. When other variables at low frequency 
are included in the regression, the coefficient on the GDP growth rate does not change 
much. Though the exchange rate and output gap are significant as well, the values of the 
coefficients are smaller compared with that on GDP growth.  
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Table 4.7 shows the results for the regression at high frequencies. This time all the 
variables are used as explanatory variables. The equation to be estimated is : 
𝜋𝑡0.5−4 = 𝛽0 + �𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑡0.5−4 + 𝛽𝜌𝜌𝑡0.5−4 + 𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑡0.5−4� + 𝛽𝑔𝑔𝑡−10.5−4 + 𝛽𝐴𝑐𝑡0.5−4 + 𝐴𝑡   (4.17) 
The dependent variable is the inflation rate at 0.5 to 4 years and the explanatory 
variables are also at that frequency. It is clear from the results that whether the crisis 
period is included or not, none of the coefficients on the quantity-theoretic variables is 
significant at the 90% significance level. And the values of those coefficients are very 
small. This suggests that the change in money growth may not have an immediate 
influence on inflation. Instead, it is the exchange rate change which is significantly 
different from 0 at the 95% level before the crisis and the 99% level after the crisis. The 
coefficient on the output gap at high frequencies becomes significant after the crisis. Its 
value indicates that a 1% rise in the output gap would lead to a 0.35% increase in 
inflation in the short run, which is much larger than the coefficients on other variables.  
Table 4.7: Regression at high frequency  
RHS variables Until2007 Until2010 
Money growth 0.034 0.247 
GDP growth -0.001 0.060 
Rate change 0.030 0.060 
Output gap 
(lagged 1 quarter) 
0.420 0.354*** 
Exchange rate change 0.059** 0.096*** 
Import price change 0.046 0.073 
***: significant at 99% significance level; 
**: significant at 95% significance level; 
*:  significant at 99% significance level; 
By comparing the estimations at low-frequencies and high-frequencies, it is clear that 
money growth has a direct influence at low frequencies but not at high frequencies. On 
the other hand, the variables which are not in the quantity theory hardly influence 
inflation in the long run but have effects in the short run. In particular, the output gap 
has a more important role in explaining inflation when the data after the crisis is 
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included. This suggests that during the crisis period, if the output gap is influenced by 
other variables, inflation in the short run would fluctuate as well. Money growth could 
be one of these variables. Though it could not affect inflation in the short run, it may 
have an indirect influence on inflation through its influence on the output gap.  
4.4.4. Granger-causality measure 
From the estimation results given in previous subsections, it is hard to ignore the long-
run relationship between money and inflation. Money growth contains information 
which can help predict inflation at low frequency. In order to support the findings about 
the relation between money and inflation further, I use a causality measure which is 
based on Granger’s definition to show the predictive power of money. The frequency-
wise causality between money and inflation is shown in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6, and 
the causality between output gap and inflation in Figure 4.7. 
Before starting the causality measure, I have to clarify that the causality measure in my 
work doesn’t strictly indicate a causal relationship in the normal, everyday, sense. There 
is no universal agreement on the definition of causality. People have different 
conceptions about it. Sims (1972) defined causality by including both lagged values and 
forward values in the regressions while in Granger’s definition the right-hand-side 
variables of the regressions only include lagged values. What’s more, even though the 
empirical work suggests that variable A explains variable B in future which can’t be 
predicted fully by the lagged values of B, it is still hard to define this simple empirical 
result as ‘causality’ without a clear theoretical illustration on the transmission process. 
Tobin (1970) referred to the conception of ‘causality’ being used by Friedman and 
others in empirical work as post hoc ergo propter hoc. He argued that Friedman (1956) 
should not have concluded money causes inflation because the timing of money leads 
the timing of price. In his (1970) reply to Tobin Friedman carefully explained the 
conception of ‘money causes inflation’ as ‘changes in money supply account for a large 
part of variance in nominal income’. According to Friedman’s definition, causality 
refers to a stable association between variables rather than controllability. Thus the 
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Granger-causality measure in my work is only used to indicate whether money growth 
indicate inflation at various frequencies.54 
Granger (1969) defined causality by comparing the predicted errors which are from the 
regressions of X on past information including/excluding information of Y. (See 
Granger 1969, p.428). If the variance of the error from the regression that includes past 
Y is smaller than that from the regression that excludes past Y, we say Y causes X. 
Under this definition, Granger and Lin (1995) further indicated that the causality 
relationships could be different between frequency bands.  
The method I employ to measure causality under Granger’s definition is from Breitung 
and Candelon (2006). In their paper, the authors developed the causality measure in the 
frequency domain proposed by Geweke (1982). It is defined as: 
𝑀𝑦→𝑥(𝜃) =  𝑙𝑙𝑔 � 2𝜋𝑓𝑥(𝜃)|𝜑11(𝑒−𝑖𝜃)�2� = log �1 + |𝜑12(𝑒−𝑖𝜃)�2|𝜑11(𝑒−𝑖𝜃)�2�                   (4.18) 
where 𝜑(𝐿) =  𝛩(𝐿)−1𝐺−1 , 𝛩(𝐿)  = I-𝛩1L - …- 𝛩𝑝𝐿𝑝  is the lag polynomial in the 
bivarate system and G is the lower triangular matrix of the Cholesky decomposition. 
𝜑12(𝐿) =  −  𝑔22Θ12(𝐿)|𝛩(𝐿)|  where 𝑔22  is the lower diagonal element of 𝐺−1  and |Θ(𝐿)| is 
the determinant of Θ(𝐿).  
Geweke (1982) suggested that y does not cause x at frequency θ if 𝜑12(𝐿) = 0, which 
means: 
 |𝛩12(𝑒−𝑖𝜃)� = �∑ 𝜗12,𝑘 cos(𝑘𝜃)− ∑ 𝜗12,𝑘 sin(𝑘𝜃) 𝑀𝑝𝑘=1𝑝𝑘=1 � = 0   (4.19) 
where 𝜗12,𝑘  is the (1,2) element of𝛩𝑘, p is the number of lags. And a set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions for causality is : 
�𝜗12,𝑘 cos(𝑘𝜃)𝑝
𝑘=1
= 0, 
                                                             
54 More issues on causality are discussed in Hoover, Kevin D.(2001), Causality in Macroeconomics, 
published by Cambridge University Press. 
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∑ 𝜗12,𝑘 sin(𝑘𝜃) = 0𝑝𝑘=1                                                                     (4.20) 
Breitung and Candelon (2006) simplified the notation. They suggested that in a 
bivariate system, the non-causality relation from Y to X at frequency θ is equivalent to a 
zero restriction on the parameters of Y. The equation for X can be expressed as: 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑥𝑡−2 + ⋯+ 𝛼𝑝𝑥𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐴1𝑡   (4.21) 
The hypothesis of no-causality is equivalent to the linear restriction: 
H0: 𝑅(𝜃)𝛽 = 0,                                   
where  β = (β1,β2, … , βp)'  and  
𝑅(𝜃) = �cos (θ) cos (2θ) … cos (𝑝θ)sin (θ) sin (2θ) … sin (𝑝θ)�            
To test the null hypothesis, a simple F statistic can be used to reflect this causality and it 
is distributed as F(2,T-2p) in my work. If the value is not significantly different from 
zero, Y does not cause X at frequency θ. However, as the causality measure varies 
from low frequency to high frequency, people have more interest in the high values and 
small values of it, rather than focus on the critical value.55  
For the money and inflation model, the lags I have included are 12: this is based on AIC 
values. Figure 4.5(a) shows the causality measure from money growth to inflation when 
12 lags are included. The causality measure has relatively high values at low frequency 
band, as well as at very high frequency band. The two peaks of the causality measure 
are at 0.15π, which corresponds to 13.3 quarters, and at 0.8π which corresponds to 2.5 
quarters. For the frequency band in the middle, the causality measure is relatively low 
particularly between 0.5π and 0.7π. If we compare the causality measure with the 
                                                             
55 Breitung and Candelon (2006) showed the significance of causal relationship following a standard 
limiting distribution in cointergrated system.AWG (2006) indicated the critical value of F is not that 
important in their work and they suggested to look at peaks and troughs. 
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critical value at 10% significance level which is 2.348 here, we can reject the null 
hypothesis at the frequency band (0.1π to 0.2π) and at the band (0.75π to π).  
Figure 4.5(b) shows the feedback from inflation to money. There are three peaks which 
are at 0.18π, 0.4π and 0.8π. The values of these three peaks are larger as the frequency 
goes higher. If we compare the measures with the critical value, we can’t reject the null 
at the frequency band below 0.4π. And we can reject the null at the band 0.4π to 0.45π, 
and at band 0.8π to π. 
According to these results, money growth ‘Granger-causes’ inflation in a long term 
which is above 2.5 years and below 5 years. The lower values of the causality measure 
from inflation to money growth can help indicate that the influence is from money to 
inflation at this frequency band. Money growth also Granger-causes inflation in the 
short term of 2.5 quarters and less. The latter result is surprising; it may reflect the 
higher proportion of noise in monetary growth data at high frequency. 
If I shrink the lag length below 12, the AIC values suggest lag=5 at any lag criterion 
from 11 to 5. The causality measures when 5 lags are included are shown in Figure 
4.6(a) and Figure 4.6(b). In Figure 4.6(a), the causality measure from money growth to 
inflation is much higher at low frequency and it peaks at frequency 0.18π which 
corresponds to the period around 3 years. Then the causality measure drops fast as the 
frequency goes to the higher bands. It reaches its trough which is zero at frequency 0.6π 
and then remains low, so that we do not find here the surprising result noted above. On 
the other hand, if we focus on the critical value, we can’t reject the null hypothesis at 
any frequency. Figure 4.6(b) also shows stable and low values at the high frequency 
band. But the peak of the causality is at 0.25π, which is different from that in (a). And 
we can’t reject the null at band 0.2π to 0.3π.  
Overall, these results present a mixed picture of the Granger-causality between money 
and inflation. However, whether the critical values are significant or not does not really 
tell us whether money ‘causes’ inflation because of the issues around the meaning of 
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causality. A full answer to that question would require further work, both conceptual 
(philosophical) and empirical.  
As I have discussed in Chapter 3, some movements in money growth, like the 
movements under QE, are not automatic responses of the monetary system but are 
exogenously decided by agents. The evidence from the estimations of Phillips curves 
and from the causality measure in some sense supports the view that money growth has 
information in indicating future inflationary pressure, rather than the view that inflation 
is totally predictable without additional information. 
Another important finding on the determinations of inflation is the significant role of the 
output gap in explaining inflation at the high frequency band which is from 1.5 years to 
4 years. The causality measure of output gap to inflation is shown in Figure 4.7 (a). 
Different from that on money, the causality measure on output gap is relatively low at 
low frequency and is even zero at frequency 0.07π, around seven years. After that, the 
causality measure increases towards the high frequency band and reaches its first peak 
at frequency 0.2π which corresponds to 2 years and half. After frequency 0.6π, which 
corresponds to 3.3 quarters, the causality measure is also relatively high. Figure 4.7(b) 
indicates that the Granger-causality from inflation to output gap is only significant 
below frequency 0.4π. 
Besides the causality measure in frequency domain, I also did Granger causality test in 
time domain. The Chi-sq value for the causality test on money growth to inflation is 
18.57 which is significant at 10% level if the lag length is 12, while if the lag length is 5 
the value is 2.48 which is not significant at 10% level. For the Granger causality test on 
inflation to money, we can’t reject the null under either circumstance. For the output gap 
to inflation the test statistic is significant at 1% level so we can reject the null. Overall, 
the Granger-causality test results, both in frequency domain and in time domain, 
provide only weak evidence on ‘causality’.  
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Figure 4.5(a) The causality measure on money growth to inflation (lags=12) 
 
 
Figure 4.5(b) The causality measure on inflation to money growth (lags=12) 
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Figure 4.6(a) The causality measure on money growth to inflation (lags=5) 
 
 
Figure 4.6(b) The causality measure on inflation to money growth (lags=5) 
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Figure 4.7(a) The causality measure on output gap to inflation 
 
 
Figure 4.7(b) The causality measure on inflation to output gap 
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4.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I discuss the relationship between money and inflation. Most research in 
the past emphasized that money has a long-run relationship with inflation. By using the 
Frequency-domain techniques to run Phillips Curve regressions, this paper supports the 
indication that money should not be forgotten in policy-making decisions. Indeed, from 
the results, it suggests that the link between money and inflation in long run is stable. 
This link is never eliminated even during the Great Moderation period when money 
seemed to be not relevant. Furthermore, the results in this paper did not exclude the 
possibility of money’s indirect influence on inflation. After comparing the relations 
between inflation and other variables before and after the crisis, I found that the output 
gap is important in influencing inflation in the short run for the U.K. If a change in 
money growth could lead to a change in the output gap, it could influence inflation in a 
relatively shorter period, especially during the present time when inflation is sensitive to 
the change in output gap and it is hard to cut the interest rate further.   
However, the findings that a monetary aggregate has a direct relationship with inflation 
in the long run doesn’t suggest that policy makers should target the monetary aggregate 
as they used to do in the 1970s. Nor does it suggest the monetary aggregate should enter 
the reaction function as a separate variable. From the Phillips Curve demonstration in 
section 4.4.1, money as well as other quantity-theoretic variables enters the equation as 
components of inflation expectations, or long run components in inflation. Thus, my 
suggestion is that policy makers should consider the information in money as a 
necessary part in the inflation expectations which policy is trying to influence. It should 
not be ignored.  
The indications from the estimation could be used to explain Quantitative Easing further. 
While most research focuses on the effect of QE on the bond market, it might be helpful 
to think about its influence through the monetary aggregates. As the figure of the M4 
growth rate shows, the money growth rate ceased to drop sharply once QE was 
implemented. From a long-run perspective, the increasing money growth would help 
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inflation to rise. And even in two or three years’ time, which is a relatively short time, 
the recovery of the M4 growth rate prevents further decline in the output gap. This 
slowdown in the output gap fall would work on inflation in the short run. In other words, 
besides interest rate setting, any policy which influences money growth could be used to 
influence inflation, in both the short run and the long run.  
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
This dissertation discusses monetary policy in the UK, including the conventional 
interest rate decisions and the unconventional asset purchases. In the tranquil time 
before the financial crisis, it suggests that a Taylor-rule type reaction function in which 
the interest rate responds to inflation forecast two years ahead and output growth one 
year ahead is a better description of interest rate decisions by the MPC, than the 
conventional GMM estimation which looks at the current output gap and the inflation 
one year ahead. Besides, the definition of ‘smoothing’ which is used in some work to 
describe the interest rate movements should be reconsidered. My finding supports the 
claims by former policy makers in the Bank of England that there is no smoothing in 
interest rate decisions. When the crisis began, the central bank conducted QE to achieve 
its objectives. This dissertation studies the effect of QE on macroeconomic activity. 
Specifically, it focuses on the direct role of monetary aggregates in activity, which has 
not been discussed for a long time. The results suggest that money growth can’t be 
ignored in helping output and controlling inflation. If QE had not been conducted, the 
output within two years after the first quarter of 2009 might have been much lower than 
the actual one due to the sharp reduction in money growth. And in the long run, the 
relationship between money and inflation indicates that it would be difficult to hit 
inflation targets consistently without considering money.  
When I studied the reaction function issue in Chapter 2, I tried to apply the ex ante 
approach to the ECB’s reaction function. The problem was that there are no explicit 
staff projections available. Though I used SPF forecasts in place of internal forecasts 
and also carried out the regression with a different timing as a check, the estimation is 
still not genuinely ex ante in the Goodhart (2005) sense. The limited number of results 
did give us some implications. It didn’t support the conventional horizon which is j=4 
and k=0 for the ECB. It preferred longer horizons for both inflation and output, which is 
close to the empirical work in the book on the transmission mechanism produced by the 
ECB. The possible reason for this, as I discussed after comparing the two approaches 
for the BoE case, is that the projections contain some additional information beyond 
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what is in the instruments used in GMM. The limited instruments in GMM method 
make it hard to get the actual projections of policy makers. The SPF, though it is more 
ambiguous than the projections published by BoE, is still much closer to the actual 
projections. In this way, the estimation for the ECB should also encourage people to 
apply the ex ante approach if possible.  
The latter part of the dissertation is mainly on the effect of QE. I emphasized on 
whether the change in money growth, which is brought about by QE, has influence on 
output and inflation. Chapter 3 discusses how money influenced nominal spending in 
the medium run. Instead of discussing the effect through various financial market yields, 
I preferred to study the effect of money on spending directly. The flow of funds matrix it 
was used to illustrate how the change in money in one sector has successive effects on 
other claims and other sectors. A simple naive regression was then undertaken to 
estimate this effect. And by constructing different counterfactuals, I have a range for the 
effect of money change on nominal spending. In addition, I had tried a simple SVAR 
before I started the regression. Those results, together with the results in other 
researchers’ work, suggest that the change in money has an effect on output though the 
amount of the effect estimated varies.   
Chapter 4 mainly focuses on the long run effect of money change under QE. As price 
stability is the first objective of the central bank, QE, that is, the change in money is 
expected to link to inflation. By frequency domain techniques, I tried to explain 
inflation at different frequencies by different variables. The link between money and 
inflation is found in the estimation but only in the long run. Besides, the output gap is 
suggested to have an influence on inflation in the medium run. It indicates that we 
should always keep an eye on money in the long term. Together with the indications 
given in Chapter 3, it also suggests that if QE is considered to have effect on the output 
gap, it also has an indirect effect on inflation.  
There are some issues I haven’t discussed in this dissertation. For the effect of QE, I 
only estimate that money has an effect on macroeconomic activity and this effect goes 
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through all the transmission channels but I don’t discuss the micro-economic 
foundations of how the various sectors optimize their utilities under QE. Other 
researchers have provided evidence on how QE influences financial market rates, but 
they have little empirical work on how those yield changes influence output and 
inflation. Furthermore, since the interest rate has dropped to the effective lower bound, 
previous models in the last ten years are no longer that satisfactory in explaining the 
economy now. Maybe a new model should be constructed. In my dissertation, I show 
some evidence and indications but not from a complex model.  
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